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REASONABLE PRECAUTION FOR THE
INDIVIDUAL
DOV WAISMANt

INTRODUCTION

Negligence law rests on the idea that imposing risks of harm
on others is an acceptable and unavoidable part of social life.
Most of the socially beneficial activities that make modern life
possible-from
building
skyscrapers
to
manufacturing
prescription drugs to operating power plants-impose nontrivial
risks of death or serious bodily harm on workers, consumers, or
bystanders, but such risks are widely thought to be morally
tolerable provided they are moderated by the exercise of
reasonable precaution.
There is no consensus, however, about just what it means to
exercise reasonable precaution. United States courts typically
rely on the notion of a reasonable person, defining reasonable
precautions as those a reasonably careful or prudent person
would have taken under the circumstances. 1 However, in the
t Associate Professor of Law, Southwestern Law School. A.B., Harvard College.
M.S., Philosophy, U.C. San Diego. J.D., UCLA. I am indebted to Ryan Abbott,
Jessica Berch, Samuel Bray, Alan Calnan, Michael Dorff, Dave Fagundes, Sam
Feldman, Lisa Freeman, Johann Frick, Barbara Fried, Priya Gupta, Danielle Hart,
Aaron James, Greg Keating, Herb Krimmel, Joseph MacKenzie, Art McEvoy, Austen
Parrish, Gowri Ramachandran, Tim Scanlon, Bob Schwartz, Shira Sergant, Seana
Shiffrin, Ken Simons, Micah Smith, Byron Stier, Carol Waisman, and James
Waisman for their feedback and support. I am especially grateful to Barbara Fried
and Greg Keating for particularly helpful and illuminating exchanges in connection
with this Article. I also thank the participants in the September 2012 Southern
California Junior Law Faculty Workshop at UCLA Law School and the 2014
Harvard-Stanford-Yale Junior Faculty Forum at Stanford Law School. Finally, I
thank Christina Marquez, David McFadden, Stephanie Peatman, and Maxine
Sawoya for excellent research assistance. Of course, all errors are mine.
1 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL

HARM § 3 cmt. d (2010) ("As far as instructing the jury is concerned, pattern jury
instructions frequently explain the negligence standard in terms of the reasonably
prudent person."); see also Patrick J. Kelley & Laurel A. Wendt, What Judges Tell
Juries About Negligence: A Review of Pattern Jury Instructions, 77 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 587, 595 (2002) ("In most pattern jury instructions on negligence, negligence is
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almost seventy years since Judge Learned Hand articulated his
famous negligence formula in United States v. Carroll Towing
Co.,2 no substantive interpretation of reasonable precaution-no
interpretation that purports to specify the decision rule that a
reasonable person would follow in deciding whether to take a
particular precaution-has gained anything close to widespread
acceptance. 3
One idea that has found widespread acceptance is Hand's
insight that reasonable precaution has something to do with
balancing the burdensomeness of taking a particular safety
precaution against the probability and severity of the injuries the
precaution protects against.4 It is unreasonable not to take a
minimally burdensome precaution if it will significantly reduce
the likelihood of someone suffering a serious injury. As the
precaution becomes more burdensome, the idea of not taking the
precaution becomes less unreasonable.
Yet, beyond this
fundamental Handian insight, there is little consensus about
exactly where and how to draw the line between reasonable and
unreasonable precaution in particular cases.
Perhaps the most influential attempt to do so is based on the
notion of aggregate costs. This interpretation of reasonable care
rests on the axiom that the goal of risk regulation is, as Guido
Calabresi once put it, to "reduce the sum of the costs of accidents

defined by using both the concept of ordinary care and the concept of the conduct of a
reasonably careful person or one of her close relatives.").
2 See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) ("[J]f
the probability [of injury] be called P; the injury, L; and the burden [of adequate
precautions], B; liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e.,
whether B less than PL."); see also Moisan v. Loftus, 178 F.2d 148, 149 (2d Cir.
1949); Conway v. O'Brien, 111 F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir. 1940), rev'd, 312 U.S. 492
(1941).
1 See generally Alan D. Miller & Ronen Perry, The Reasonable Person,87 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 323, 327, 328-70 (2012) (describing a range of different substantive
interpretations of the reasonable person standard based on differing "normative
ethical theories" that "may be mutually exclusive or at least inconsistent in
fundamental respects").
4 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL

§ 3 cmt. d (2010) (observing that the risk-benefit balancing approach to
negligence has been accepted by a number of leading torts treatises, by many
deterrence- and corrective justice-oriented tort scholars, and in judicial opinions "in
a large majority of jurisdictions").
' See id. cmt. f.
HARM

6

Id.

REASONABLE PRECA UTION

2014]

and the costs of avoiding accidents."7 If so, then reasonable care
should consist of taking all and only those precautions that cost
less than the amount they would be expected to save in total
accident costs.8 Put in marginalist terms, reasonable care means
spending on safety precaution up to the point at which the next
dollar spent yields less than a dollar's reduction in expected
accident costs.9 Call this reasonable care as efficient care.1" This
interpretation certainly has its virtues. For one thing, it is
almost certainly the most straightforward interpretation of
Hand's insight. Moreover, it nicely vindicates the intuition that
the reasonable level of precaution will rarely be so burdensome
as to make the risky activity not worth engaging in.
But efficient care is dogged by a persistent problem. By
taking a "bottom line" approach that focuses exclusively on
aggregate costs and benefits, summed across all affected persons,
efficient care remains largely insensitive to how costs and
benefits are distributed among different individuals, and
therefore leads to results some find counterintuitive."
For example, suppose a major city with a population of five
million people is building a half-mile-long suspension bridge
across a river. The city is considering whether to invest in

7 GUIDO

CALABRESI,

THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC

ANALYSIS 26 (1970).
1 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32-

33 (1972).
See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 87 (1987) (advocating marginalist interpretation of Hand

formula); Stephen G. Gilles, On Determining Negligence: Hand Formula Balancing,
the Reasonable Person Standard, and the Jury, 54 VAND. L. REV. 813, 826 n.39
(2001) (noting that "the issue is the marginal costs and benefits of additional
precautions").
10 The type of efficiency at issue here is Kaldor-Hicks, rather than Pareto. See,
e.g., MATTHEW

D. ADLER,

WELL-BEING AND FAIR DISTRIBUTION

98-99

(2012)

(defining Kaldor-Hicks efficiency).
11 So-called "distributively weighted" cost-benefit analysis makes some attempt
to account for distributional differences, but is still interpersonally aggregative. See
id. at 109 ("Distributively weighted CBA takes the form of summing individual
WTP/WTA amounts multiplied by individual weights." (emphasis added)). See
generally Matthew D. Adler, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Distributional Weights: An
Overview
(Aug.
20,
2013)
(unpublished
manuscript),
available at
http://www.ssrn.conmabstract=2313388. Even distributively weighted cost-benefit
analysis is therefore unlikely to be able to capture moral intuitions founded on
interpersonal tradeoffs occurring at the level of the individual.
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special safety netting12 to protect the two thousand construction
workers on the bridge project (none of whom live in the city) from
fatal falls. Suppose that, although safety netting has been widely
used in the construction industry for decades, it has not been
universally adopted. 13 If the city invests in the safety netting,
one worker can be expected to die in a fall over the course of the
five years it will take to complete the bridge. If the city uses only
regular scaffolding without netting, two workers can be expected
to fall to their deaths during those five years. Using the safety
netting will add $10 million to the $1 billion cost of constructing
the bridge, which is divided equally among the five million city
residents. Assigning a value of $5 million to a human life,14 the
city calculates that the costs of the safety netting ($10 million)
substantially exceed the expected accident costs associated with
not using it ($5 million).
On that account, is it morally
permissible for the city to use only regular scaffolding in
constructing the bridge? 6

29 C.F.R. § 1926.502(c) (2014) (designating safety netting as an acceptable
fall protection system for employees).
13 See, e.g., Press Release, Health and Safety Exec., Contractor in Court for
Ignoring Safety Risks (Jan. 27, 2014), http://press.hse.gov.uk/2014/contractor-incourt-for-ignoring-safety-risks-2/ (noting the contractor '"had failed to ensure that
protective measures, such as scaffold edge protection and safety netting, were in
place to prevent or mitigate a fall from height, leaving the three men at risk of
serious or fatal injury" (emphasis added)).
14 Throughout this Article, I use this $5 million figure to represent the monetary
value of a human life. It lies at the lower end of the spectrum of recent attempts by
federal agencies to set the value of a statistical life. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Cass
R. Sunstein, Dollars and Death, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 537, 549-51 (2005) (noting that
"most regulatory agencies have now converged on a fairly narrow range for the
valuation of life: $5 million to $6.5 million").
15 Precisely this sort of calculation was at issue in the famous Ford Pinto case.
See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Ct. App. 1981); see also Gary T.
Schwartz, The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case, 43 RUTGERs L. REV. 1013, 1020 (1991)
(describing a Ford report produced during discovery in Grimshaw which concluded
the $11-per-vehicle cost of a safety device designed to prevent fuel tank fires in the
Pinto (in 12.5 million vehicles, for a total of $137 million) exceeded the benefit of
avoiding the 180 deaths and 180 serious burn injuries expected to occur were the
safety device not included (a total of $49.5 million, using $200,000 as the value of a
statistical life and $67,000 as the value of injury avoidance)).
16 I place assumption of risk considerations to the side here. For purposes of the
hypothetical, one can assume that the workers mean to willingly assume only the
risk that remains after all reasonable precautions have been taken. The workers'
assumption of that risk itself plays no role in determining the reasonable level of
precaution.
12
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If reasonable care is efficient care, then the city has no moral
obligation to invest in the safety netting. This is true despite
that the safety netting cuts each worker's risk of death in half
(from one in one thousand to one in two thousand),17 can be
expected to save one worker's life, and would impose an
additional cost of just $2 on each city resident.
The intuition that the city ought to invest in the safety
netting-notwithstanding that doing so is not marginally costjustified and reduces the aggregate well-being of city residents
and bridge workers on net-is, I submit, one that many people
would hold.18 One possible source of that intuition relates to the
manner in which risks and safety costs are distributed: The
risks and costs fall on distinct groups of persons, and the risks
are concentrated on a group that is a tiny fraction of the size of
the vast group of persons among whom the safety costs are
spread. As a result, using the netting results in significantly
enhanced safety for each worker at a cost that, while significant
in the aggregate, imposes a trivial monetary burden on each city
resident. Holding that a life-saving precaution like the safety
netting need not be taken on account of its aggregate cost leaves
efficient care vulnerable to the charge John Rawls famously

17

Throughout this Article, I employ a frequentist, objectivist conception of risk,

rather than a Bayesian, subjectivist conception. See Stephen Perry, Risk, Harm,
Interests, and Rights, in RISK: PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 190, 190-92 (Tim
Lewens ed., 2007) (distinguishing between frequentist and Bayesian conceptions of
risk and adopting the former). But see Matthew D. Adler, Against "IndividualRisk":
A Sympathetic Critique of Risk Assessment, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1121, 1131-33 (2005)

(arguing that risk regulation should be based on a Bayesian, rather than a
frequentist, conception of risk).
" See, e.g., Gregory C. Keating, Pressing PrecautionBeyond the Point of CostJustification, 56 VAND. L. REV. 653, 656-57 (2003) [hereinafter Keating, Pressing

Precaution] ("[O]ur juries are repulsed by the claim that accidental deaths should
not be prevented whenever the costs of prevention exceed the value-economically
conceived-of the lives at risk."); Kenneth W. Simons, Tort Negligence, Cost-Benefit
Analysis, and Tradeoffs: A Closer Look at the Controversy, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1171,

1180 (2008) ("The lesson that many people take from the Pinto case itself is that the
very act of engaging in cost-benefit analysis displays morally reprehensible
callousness."); Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Heuristicsand Risk, in RISK: PHILOSOPHICAL
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 17, at 162 (citing studies showing that "ordinary

people... tend to punish companies that base their decisions on cost-benefit
analysis, even if a high valuation is placed on human life"); cf. Schwartz, supra note
15, at 1035-38 ("What seems obvious enough is that there exists a basic belief held
by many (indeed most) of the public that it is wrong for a corporation to make
decisions that sacrifice the lives of its customers in order to reduce the corporation's
costs, to increase its profits.").

658

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88:653

leveled against utilitarianism: That by focusing exclusively on
aggregate costs and benefits, and ignoring the costs and benefits
to individuals, utilitarianism fails to "take seriously the
distinction between persons."19
But is there an alternative interpretation of reasonable
precaution that, unlike efficient care, can accommodate common
moral intuitions in cases like the suspension bridge? It is all well
and good to insist that morality or fairness requires taking more
than the efficient level of precaution in some cases, but that
position seems empty (or at least unconvincing) unless one can
say with some specificity when pressing precaution beyond the
point of efficiency is required and how much further precaution is
required. It takes a theory to beat a theory, in other words.2 ° So
is there a viable alternative to efficient care and other
aggregative interpretations of reasonable precaution?
In a series of provocative and important essays, Professor
Barbara Fried has recently argued that no such alternative
exists or even could exist.21 Fried thinks it is impossible to strike
an appropriate balance between the competing interests in
liberty and security-a balance lying at the heart of the question
whether a given risk imposition is morally permissible-without
summing up the expected costs and benefits across persons and,
in many instances, trading life-and-limb costs to one group of
persons against individually trivial monetary benefits to another,
much larger group.2 2
Nonaggregative approaches to risk
regulation "must fail," Fried asserts, because "the problem of
risk, by its nature, can be managed only with the sorts of

19 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 24 (rev. ed. 1999); see also Barbara

H. Fried, The Limits of a NonconsequentialistApproach to Torts, 18 LEGAL THEORY
231, 231-32 (2012) [hereinafter Fried, Limits] (addressing charge that cost-benefit

analysis "fails to respect the separateness of people").
21 See, e.g., Fried, Limits, supra note 19, at 259-60 ("I think it is fair to say that
you cannot beat a bad candidate with no candidate, and in my view
nonconsequentialists do not offer a viable candidate.").
21 See id. at 231-61; Barbara H. Fried, Can Contractualism Save Us from
Aggregation?, 16 J. ETHICS 39, 43-46, 50-58 (2012) [hereinafter Fried,
Contractualism];see also Barbara H. Fried, What Does Matter? The Case for Killing
the Trolley Problem (or Letting It Die), 62 PHIL Q. 505, 512-13 (2012) [hereinafter
Fried, Trolley]. Fried is William W. and Gertrude H. Saunders Professor of Law at

Stanford Law School.
22

Fried, Limits, supra note 19, at 250, 260-61.
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interpersonal trade-offs ''23 "in which the numbers count, such
that a risk of serious harm to one person can be justified by small
benefits to the many. '"24

In this Article, I argue that Fried is mistaken, and that a
viable, nonaggregative alternative to efficient care does indeed
exist. If reasonable precaution is keyed to the costs and risks
borne by each affected person, rather than to those borne by
aggregates of persons, a distinct interpretation of reasonable
precaution emerges: the individualized feasibility principle
("IFP"). A bipartite standard, the IFP holds that, when engaging
in a socially beneficial activity that imposes a risk of serious
harm on certain individuals, exercising reasonable care means
investing in safety precautions until the lesser of the following
two points is reached: (1) the point at which further investment
in safety would burden the well-being of each cost-bearer more
than it would enhance the expected well-being of each riskbearer; or (2) the point at which further investment in safety
would jeopardize the long-term viability of the underlying
activity.25 In other words, the IFP requires the risks posed by a
socially useful activity to be reduced to the maximum extent
possible without jeopardizing the long-term survival of the
activity, unless doing so would require each cost-bearer to invest
more in safety precaution than a risk-bearer would rationally
have been willing to invest to protect herself from the risk at
issue.
To illustrate using the bridge hypothetical, the IFP would
require that the safety netting be used. The netting imposes a
cost of $2 on each city resident, while reducing each worker's risk
of death from one in one thousand to one in two thousand. Using
$5 million as a (conservative) value of a statistical life, each
23 Fried, Contractualism,supra note 21, at 40.
24 Id. at 39.
21 I follow Gregory Keating in holding that the

principle of economic feasibility
plays an important role in fixing the level of reasonable precaution with respect to
risks of serious bodily harm imposed by major, socially productive activities. See
generally Gregory C. Keating, A Social Contract Conception of the Tort Law of
Accidents, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS 22, 46-51 (Gerald J. Postema ed.,
2001) [hereinafter Keating, Social Contract]; Keating, Pressing Precaution, supra
note 18, at 684-748; Gregory C. Keating, Irreparable Injury and Extraordinary
Precaution: The Safety and Feasibility Norms in American Accident Law, 4
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 1, 25-88 (2003) [hereinafter Keating, IrreparableInjury];
Gregory C. Keating, Pricelessnessand Life: An Essay for Guido Calabresi,64 MD. L.
REV. 159, 180-219 (2005) [hereinafter Keating, Pricelessness and Life].
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worker would rationally be willing to pay $2,500 for this
reduction in risk. Since a safety gain worth $2,500 to each riskbearer can be achieved at a cost of just $2 to each cost-bearer, the
IFP requires the investment to be made so long as the
widespread use of safety netting would not imperil the survival of
the bridge construction industry.
It would not since, by
hypothesis, safety netting has long been widely used in bridge
construction. Thus, under the IFP, the safety netting is a
reasonable precaution, notwithstanding that its use is inefficient,
since it involves spending $10 million to achieve a $5 million
savings in accident costs. 26 The IFP generates this result without
summing costs and benefits across persons; instead, under the
IFP, the netting's monetary cost to a single representative costbearer ($2) is compared with the netting's safety benefit to a
single representative risk-bearer (a risk reduction worth $2,500).
For this reason, the IFP can claim to respect the separateness of
persons in a way that standard cost-benefit analysis ("CBA") does
not.
The IFP represents what I believe to be a novel and
compelling interpretation of the injunction to exercise reasonable
precaution when engaging in a socially beneficial activity that
places some persons at risk of serious bodily harm. 27 The IFP
better accommodates popular moral intuitions in an important
class of cases often found in the actual world: cases in which a
risk is borne by a relatively small group of persons (typically,
workers or bystanders) and safety costs are spread among a
distinct and much larger group of persons (typically, consumers

2' An economist might respond that this example shows only that human life
has been undervalued, not that aggregative cost-benefit analysis fails to harmonize
with moral common sense. However, an analogous hypothetical can be constructed
no matter how high the value assigned to a statistical life. For example, suppose life
were assigned a value of $20 million, rather than $5 million. The same
counterintuitive results follow if we stipulate that the cost of the netting is $40
million and that that cost is to be spread among 20 million city residents. In that
case, we get the same result: Cost-benefit analysis forbids the netting, even though
it will reduce each worker's risk by fifty percent, will save a life, and will impose a

cost of $2 on each city resident.
27 Though Keating took the first, critical step toward this principle by focusing
scholarly attention on the economic feasibility norm and its underlying moral
rationale, no commentator has, to my knowledge, articulated the individual risk
principle (see infra Part II) or proposed conjoining it with the feasibility norm in the
manner I do in this Article.
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or tax-payers). For this reason, the IFP deserves to be considered
alongside aggregative standards in the ongoing quest for a
comprehensive theoretical account of reasonable precaution.
Though I do not go so far as to claim that aggregative
reasoning has no place in the moral analysis of risk imposition, I
do believe that something morally significant will be missed if
the problem of risk imposition is viewed exclusively through the
lens of aggregative CBA. The individualized feasibility principle
keys reasonable precaution to the costs and benefits experienced
by each affected individual, rather than to costs and benefits
considered in the aggregate. Individual costs and benefits carry
particular moral force because that is what persons actually
experience; no person experiences aggregate costs or benefits.
Aggregative approaches to reasonable precaution-while they
capture a "God's eye" perspective that may be important in its
own right-also miss something important, which is the
perspective of the individual.
On this account, aggregative
approaches have been accused, rightly in my view, of failing to
respect the separateness of persons.
So, what would an
interpretation of reasonable precaution that did take seriously
the separateness of persons look like? That is the question I
address in this Article, not because I think aggregative reasoning
has no place in the moral analysis of risk imposition, but because
the perspective of the individual has received comparatively less
attention in the relevant literature and, in my view, captures an
important aspect of moral judgment.
This Article has four parts. In Part I, I introduce the
question to be explored and describe Barbara Fried's challenge to
any attempt to answer that question without summing costs and
benefits across persons. Part II responds directly to Fried's
challenge, presenting the individualized feasibility principle as a
viable, nonaggregative interpretation of reasonable precaution.
In Part III, I explore the theoretical underpinnings of the IFP,
drawing on a theory of normative ethics known as ex ante
contractualism.28 Part IV concludes.
2S

Ex ante contractualism is a version of contractualist moral theory, which was

introduced by T.M. Scanlon in 1982. See T.M. Scanlon, Contractualism and
Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 103, 103-28 (Amartya Sen &
Bernard Williams eds., 1982) [hereinafter Scanlon, Contractualism];T.M. SCANLON,
WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 189-247 (1998) [hereinafter SCANLON, WHAT WE

OWE]. In his 1982 article, Scanlon credits Rawls with first suggesting the possibility
of a contractualist theory of normative ethics. See Scanlon, Contractualism,supra, at
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I.
THE CHALLENGE FOR NONAGGREGATIVE RISK THEORY: IS
SUMMING COSTS AND BENEFITS ACROSS PERSONS THE ONLY
(POSSIBLE) GAME IN TOWN?

A.

The Question

Consider once again the suspension bridge hypothetical
discussed supra in the Introduction. Five essential features of
this example make it representative of a broad class of risk
imposition cases: (1) a socially beneficial activity poses a risk of
harm; (2) the risk posed is one of accidentally-inflicted injury;
(3) the sort of harm at issue is death or serious physical injury;
(4) in terms of its probability, the risk is low, but not
insignificant; and (5) the costs of reducing the risk come
primarily in the form of wealth, income, or inconvenience. Aside
from large-scale construction projects like the building of bridges,
dams, highways, stadiums, and skyscrapers, some other
examples of activities that share these core features include:
public utility projects like the generation and widespread
delivery of electric power; machine- or chemical-based factory
processes used by firms in manufacturing goods; clinical drug
trials; and vaccination initiatives.
In cases of this type, what level of precaution is the actor
morally required to exercise? That is the question I explore in
this Article.29 I should be clear on the particular kind of answer I
am seeking. I seek a substantive decision rule that could be used
103-04; see also RAWLS, supra note 19, at 15 ("For it is clear that the contractarian
idea can be extended to the choice of more or less an entire ethical system, that is, to
a system including principles for all the virtues and not only for
justice.... Obviously if justice as fairness succeeds reasonably well, a next step
would be to study the more general view suggested by the name 'rightness as
fairness.' ").
29 In this Article, I do not purport to advance a general interpretation of the
reasonable care standard. I mean only to address cases in which a repetitive,
coordinated, firm-based activity with substantial social benefits imposes a risk of
serious bodily harm on certain individuals, such as workers, consumers, or
bystanders. I do not, for example, mean to address cases in which the private acts of
individuals-for example, riding a bicycle or walking a dog on a public road, making
a campfire at a public campsite, mowing a front lawn, and so on-impose nontrivial
risks of serious bodily harm on other individuals. See Keating, Social Contract,
supra note 25, at 39-42 (distinguishing for purposes of tort liability between the
"world of acts," a world of "'isolated, ungeneralized wrongs,'" and the "world of
activities," a world "in which certain risks are the regular and routine 'incidents of
certain well-known businesses'" (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the
Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 467 (1897))).
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in specific cases to determine whether the actor was morally
obligated to take a particular precaution or to fix the precise
amount of money the actor is morally required to invest in safety
precautions.30 Here are two examples of insufficiently specific
answers that would fail this test: "The actor is morally required
to take all precautions that would have been taken by a
reasonably careful person under the circumstances," and "The
actor is morally required to take precautions such that the
resulting risk imposed is one it is fair to ask others to bear."
These answers link the moral obligation to take precaution to a
particular concept, such as reasonableness or fairness, but they
fail to specify how, in a particular case, one would determine
whether reasonableness or fairness requires taking some
particular precaution.
I should offer two caveats before moving on. First, I have
relatively little to say here about assumption of risk, an issue
that obviously affects the morality of risk impositions in
particular cases. It is evident that, in appropriate circumstances,
a person's free and informed consent to bear a particular risk to
their own bodily integrity can render permissible an otherwise
impermissible risk imposition. 1 It seems clear, though, that
many cases we might be tempted to place under this category
fail, upon close analysis, to involve consent made freely or with
adequate information. Think, for example, of the unemployed
worker who, afraid of being unable to meet her family's basic
needs, accepts a factory job knowing that it carries significant
risks of serious injury. Does it make sense to say the worker has
32
freely assumed the risk in that case? Perhaps not.
" Fried focuses her inquiry on the same sort of substantive decision rule. See
Fried, Limits, supra note 19, at 232 n.2 ("I set to the side procedural solutions, which
do offer a clear alternative to substantive decision rules, consequentialist and
nonconsequentialist alike.").
31 See, e.g., Tim Lewens, Introduction: Risk and Philosophy, in RISK:
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 17, at 8-9 ("It is plausible, for example,

that risks which a person chooses to run can legitimately be much higher than risks
which are imposed by some other agent.").
32 See Simons, supra note 18, at 1181 (setting aside issues of consent and

assumption of risk in a discussion of morality of risk imposition because
"innumerable risky activities are tolerated in the contemporary world even though it
is unrealistic to claim or expect that all those exposed to the risk (including
bystanders and even children) subjectively 'consent' in any meaningful sense of the
term"); see also ROBERT E. KEETON ET. AL., TORT AND ACCIDENT LAW: CASES AND

MATERIALS 1256-57 (4th ed. 2004) ("[T]he risks and benefits of a consumer product

accrue to the same party, the consumer, who can choose to avoid the risk.

664

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88:653

Second, my inquiry here is primarily concerned with cases of
advertent negligence-cases in which actors knowingly choose to
take (or not to take) a particular precaution or adhere to (or not
to adhere to) a particular precautionary standard. 33 The firmbased activities with which I am concerned tend to involve
conscious, calculated decisions about whether to impose a
particular level of risk or exercise a particular level of precaution.
I set aside cases involving inadvertent failures to take particular
precautions, as such cases raise difficult questions about moral
wrongdoing and culpability that I do not wish to broach here.34
B.

BarbaraFried's Challenge

Fried throws down the gauntlet to nonconsequentialist 3 risk
theory in two recent articles that argue for essentially the same

Employees, on the other hand, rarely have such a choice-they must bear the risk of
occupational health hazards, while benefits accrue largely to employers and
consumers." (quoting Brief for Federal Respondent at 55, Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst. v.
Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981) (Nos. 79-1429 and 79-1583)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
" On the distinction between advertent and inadvertent negligence, see
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 3
cmt. k (2010).

14See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Negligence, Crime, and Tort: Comments on Hurd
and Simons, 76 B.U. L. REV. 301, 302 (1996) (stating the belief that inadvertent
negligence is not morally culpable); cf.Dov Waisman, Negligence, Responsibility, and
the Clumsy Samaritan: Is There a Fairness Rationale for the Good Samaritan
Immunity?, 29 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 609, 644-62 (2013) (arguing inadvertent samarital
negligence need not involve moral culpability, but typically gives rise to moral
responsibility for any resulting injury). But see Heidi M. Hurd, The Deontology of
Negligence, 76 B.U. L. REV. 249, 271 (1996) ("If it is wrong to do more harm than
good in the arena in which deontological maxims do not apply, then it would appear
culpable to do an act under circumstances in which the discounted value of the harm
that act will cause exceeds the costs of precautions that it would take to prevent that
harm.").
" The major divide in normative moral theory is between consequentialism and
nonconsequentialism. Consequentialists believe that the moral permissibility of an
action depends entirely on the consequences of that action (typically, its
consequences for the aggregate well-being of all affected individuals). See, e.g.,
SHELLY KAGAN, NORMATIVE ETHICS 60 (1998). The most prominent consequentialist

view is utilitarianism. See id. at 61-62. Nonconsequentialists, while not denying the
relevance of consequences, believe that the moral permissibility of an action may be
a function of factors other than and in addition to its consequences, such as whether
it conforms with a specified norm, whether it respects the rights of all involved, and
so on. See id. at 70-71. The most prominent nonconsequentialist view is deontology.
See id. at 72-73.
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core claim, doing so in slightly different ways.3" The claim is that
nonconsequentialists have failed to come up with a coherent
answer to the following question: Under what circumstances is it
morally permissible to engage in a socially beneficial activity that
imposes a nontrivial risk of serious bodily harm on others?3 7 In
Fried's view, nonconsequentialist theorists have either dodged
that question entirely, provided unacceptably vague answers (for
example, so long as one takes all "reasonable precautions"),
provided answers that apply only in very unusual circumstances
(for example, cases involving virtually certain consequences to
identifiable victims), or provided answers that so closely
resemble an interpersonally aggregative approach that they do
not warrant the nonconsequentialist label.3"
When it comes to the problem of specifying when it is
morally permissible to engage in socially beneficial conduct that
imposes a significant risk of serious harm, consequentialists tend
to clash with nonconsequentialists over the question of
interpersonalaggregation. Most versions of consequentialism are
interpersonally aggregative in the sense that the permissibility of
a particular action depends on how it will affect the aggregate
well-being of all individuals whose well-being it will affect.3 9 As
Fried puts it, an aggregative theory is one that "rank-order[s]
alternative principles for action at least in part based on their
aggregate expected benefits (costs), summed across all
potentially affected individuals. 4 ° This kind of approach tends to
commit consequentialists to the position that, as Fried puts it, "a
risk of serious harm to one person can be justified by small
benefits to the many."4 1
3 In The Limits of a Nonconsequentialist Approach to Torts, Barbara H. Fried
emphasizes the failure of deontologically-oriented tort theory (in particular,
corrective justice theory) to offer a coherent, nonaggregative alternative to costbenefit analysis for adjudging the permissibility of risk impositions. See Fried,
Limits, supra note 19, at 256-57. Conversely, in Can ContractualismSave Us from
Aggregation?, Barbara H. Fried focuses on the failure of contractualist moral theory
to provide such an alternative. See Fried, Contractualism,supra note 21, at 64-65.
" See Fried, Limits, supra note 19, at 232 ("[H] ave critics of aggregation offered
an analytically coherent substantive decision rule for regulating risky conduct that
does not itself boil down to some form of aggregation? The short answer is: I do not
think so." (foonote omitted)).
3 See id. at 231, 236, 248.
3 See id. at 262.
40 Fried, Contractualism,supra note 21, at 39-40.
41 Id. at 39.
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Nonconsequentialists, on the other hand, believe that we
cannot necessarily justify imposing a significant risk of serious
harm on the few for the sake of providing small benefits to the
many, even if the aggregate benefit of imposing the risk exceeds
its aggregate expected cost.4 2 For nonconsequentialists, even if
imposing a risk delivers a net aggregate benefit to all affected
43
individuals, it might still be wrong to impose it.
This dispute over interpersonal aggregation lies at the heart
of Fried's challenge to nonconsequentialist risk theory.
Nonconsequentialists tend to believe that morality sometimes
requires taking more than the marginally cost-justified level of
precaution. Fried charges that this position is empty (or, at the
least, unconvincing) unless nonconsequentialists can say with
some specificity when pressing precaution beyond the point of
cost-justification is required and how much further precaution is
required in such cases.44
Fried maintains that nonconsequentialists have yet to offer
"viable" answers to these questions. "[F] or these purposes," Fried
says:
I mean 'viable' in a very undemanding sense:
have
nonconsequentialists supplied criteria that, as an operational
matter, are capable of differentiating among different forms of
risky conduct? I do not reach the further question of whether
such criteria, if they exist, dominate [cost-benefit calculus] on
normative or practical grounds.45
Fried's challenge to nonconsequentialist risk theory goes
deeper than this, though. It is no accident, in her view, that
there is no extant alternative to interpersonal aggregation when
it comes to the difficult case-by-case task of determining whether
a particular risk imposition is morally permissible.
Fried
believes it is impossible to accomplish that task without
summing costs and benefits across persons: "Moreover, I will
suggest, the effort to come up with nonaggregative principles to
See Fried, Limits, supra note 19, at 259.
" This follows directly from the nonconsequentialist tenet that an act's moral
permissibility can depend on factors other than its consequences for aggregate wellbeing. See KAGAN, supra note 35, at 70-71.
" See Fried, Limits, supra note 19, at 232 ("[H]ave critics of aggregation offered
an analytically coherent substantive decision rule for regulating risky conduct that
does not itself boil down to some form of aggregation? The short answer is: I do not
think so." (footnote omitted)).
" See id. at 234, 259-60.
42
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handle the problem of risk must fail-that the problem of risk, by
its nature, can be managed only with the sorts of interpersonal
trade-offs that the contractualist enterprise is foundationally
committed to rejecting."4
Summing costs and benefits across persons is, in Fried's
view, the only way to negotiate the inevitable conflict between
liberty and security that arises in connection with socially
beneficial conduct that imposes a nontrivial risk of harm.4 7 In
Fried's view, without interpersonal aggregation, a theory forfeits
the capacity to explain why morality allows us to engage in the
wide range of significantly risky but socially beneficial activities
that characterize life in modern, industrialized societies.48
Though Fried does at one point expressly consider the
possibility that nonconsequentialist moral theory dictates taking
a level of precaution that exceeds the level of precaution dictated
by efficient care,4 9 she fails to identify the economic feasibility
principle, or anything resembling it, as a possible precautionary
alternative. For example, she observes:
What it means to take 'reasonable precautions' is described in
many different ways in the nonconsequentialist literature: One
should behave in a fashion that is not negligent, that respects
the legitimate interests of others to be free from harm, that is
not wrongful, unreasonable or unjustifiable, that gives people
what they are due; one should adopt safety measures that will
substantially lower the risk at a reasonable cost. But it is
unclear whether these different verbal formulations imply
different standards of conduct, and whether any of them differs
significantly from the optimal level of precaution dictated by
aggregative techniques."°
Here Fried alleges that the nonconsequentialist literature on
risk regulation has nothing to offer in the way of an alternative
precautionary standard other than vague reformulations of the
injunction to exercise reasonable precaution.

4 Fried, Contractualism,supra note 21, at 40; see also Fried, Limits, supra note
19, at 256, 262.
4 Fried, Contractualism,supra note 21, at 64.
Fried, Limits, supra note 19, at 259-60.
See Fried, Contractualism,supra note 21, at 61.
o See id. at 62; see also Fried, Trolley, supra note 21.
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This allegation is baseless.
At least since 2001, when
Keating published a paper 1 identifying the economic feasibility
principle as the precautionary standard emerging from Kantian
social contract theory, the nonconsequentialist literature has
indeed featured a determinate precautionary alternative to
efficient care. 2 Fried's failure to even once take note of, much
less discuss, the possibility of a precautionary standard that is
keyed to the survival of the underlying activity is puzzling,
particularly in light of the radical nature of her critique, that is,
that there is no viable alternative on the table. 3 But is that
oversight fatal to her claim that no precautionary standard can
yield plausible, determinate results in ordinary types of cases
without relying on interpersonal aggregation?
I believe it is. Building on Keating's foundational work, 4 I
describe
an
alternative
precautionary
standard-the
individualized feasibility principle-which avoids reliance on
interpersonal aggregation and delivers determinate, morally
plausible results in ordinary types of cases, thereby answering
Fried's challenge.5

" See Keating, Social Contract, supra note 25, at 22-51. In a series of papers

that followed, Keating developed his account of the social contract rationale
underlying the feasibility and safety norms found in American risk regulation. See
Keating, Pressing Precaution, supra note 18, at 684-748. See generally Keating,
IrreparableInjury, supra note 25; Keating, Pricelessnessand Life, supra note 25.
52 Keating, Social Contract, supra note 25, at 47-48.
" See Fried, Limits, supra note 19, at 232-33.
14 See supra note 51.
" Aaron James has responded to Fried's challenge in a general way, arguing

that an appropriately specified ex ante version of contractualism need neither forbid
interpersonal aggregation altogether nor succumb to a perilous slide into morally
implausible forms of such aggregation. See Aaron James, Contractualism's(Not So)
Slippery Slope, 18 LEGAL THEORY 263, 288-90 (2012). I here take up the task that

James expressly declines to tackle: "answer[ing] Fried's doubts about whether, in a
vast range of ordinary public policy choices, ideas of 'reasonable cost' or 'adequate
opportunity to avoid' can be operationalized other than in aggregative cost-benefit
terms." Id. at 289; see also John Oberdiek, The Morality of Risking: On the
Normative Foundations of Risk Regulation 187 n.36 (2003) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Pennsylvania), available at http://search.proquest.conv

docview/305311307 (offering a nonaggregative theory of the morality of risk
imposition, but "postpon[ing] for another occasion" the "(less philosophical) project"
of "[d] elineating concrete standards of permissible risking" that such a theory would
generate).
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11.

ANSWERING THE CHALLENGE: THE INDIVIDUALIZED
FEASIBILITY PRINCIPLE

The individualized feasibility principle represents a
synthesis of two precautionary standards: the economic
feasibility principle, which has long been part of American law,
and the individual risk principle, a novel risk regulation
principle I introduce in this Article. In any given case, each of
these principles will dictate a distinct level of investment in
safety precaution. In some cases, the feasibility principle will
dictate a greater investment in safety than will the individual
risk principle. In others, the opposite will be true. In any given
case, the IFP directs the actor imposing the risk to comply with
whichever of these two principles dictates the lesser investment
in safety.
A.

The Economic FeasibilityPrinciple

The economic feasibility principle holds as follows: When
engaging in a socially beneficial activity that imposes a
significant risk of serious bodily harm on certain individuals, the
actor imposing the risk should take all economically feasible
precautions.5
The term "all economically feasible precautions"
refers to the set of safety precautions that, in the case of a
particular risk, yields the maximum reduction in accident costs
(deaths and serious injuries) consistent with the long-term
viability of the risky activity in question. 7
An economic feasibility standard has been part of American
law for decades. Most prominently, certain portions of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 19708 implement the
feasibility principle.
The Occupational Health and Safety
Administration ("OSHA") requires employers to reduce
workplace risks posed by toxic materials or harmful physical

See Keating, PressingPrecaution,supra note 18, at 685.
See id.(explaining that, under the economic feasibility standard, "[c]ostjustified risks are eliminated, so long as their elimination is compatible with the
long-term flourishing of the activity at issue, and significant risks remain only if
their elimination would threaten the survival of the activity"); see also Keating,
Social Contract, supra note 25, at 46 ("When risks are significant, and when life and
limb are pitted against wealth and income, then, we should reduce risks to the point
where they are either no longer unreasonable, or where further reduction would
jeopardize the continuation of the activity itself.").
" Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (2012).
5
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agents "to the extent feasible," 9 meaning to the maximum extent
possible without jeopardizing the long-term survival of the
industry. 0 Moreover, a feasibility standard has long been part of
American nuisance law. 1
The economic feasibility principle can account for the
intuition that, in many cases, risk-creators are morally obligated
to press precaution beyond the point of marginal costjustifiability.
Typically, it will dictate a greater level of
precaution than aggregative standards like efficient care.6
However, the economic feasibility principle stops short of placing
implausibly onerous moral constraints on those wishing to
engage in socially beneficial but significantly risky activities.
The principle avoids what Barbara Fried has called a "moral
gridlock" 3 because it allows socially useful activities that are
sure to result in accidental deprivations of life and limb to go
forward, provided significant risks are reduced to the maximum
extent possible without undermining the activity at issue. 4 The
economic feasibility standard sets the required level of
" See id. § 655(b)(5) ("The Secretary, in promulgating standards dealing with
toxic materials or harmful physical agents under this subsection, shall set the
standard which most adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the
best available evidence, that no employee will suffer material impairment of health
or functional capacity even if such employee has regular exposure to the hazard
dealt with by such standard for the period of his working life." (emphasis added)).
60 See Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 530 n.55 (1981) (holding
the cotton dust standard economically feasible because "the industry will maintain
long-term profitability and competitiveness"); United Steelworkers of Am. v.
Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1265 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("A standard is feasible if it does not
threaten 'massive dislocation' to, or imperil the existence of, the industry." (citations
omitted)).
61

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826(b) (1979).

See, e.g., Keating, PressingPrecaution,supra note 18, at 684-85 (noting that
the feasibility principle generally tolerates less risk than the cost-justification
standard); KEETON ET AL., supra note 32, at 1237-41 (discussing a continuum of
precautionary standards in which the feasibility standard is considered less tolerant
of risk than the cost-benefit balancing standard). However, if accident costs are
largely externalized, it seems at least theoretically possible for an efficient
expenditure on precaution not to be feasible (that is, for the maximum feasible
safety expenditure to be sub-efficient). See Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner,
Against Feasibility Analysis, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 657, 697 (2010) (arguing that the
economic feasibility principle would result in "underregulation"-meaning subefficient regulation-in certain circumstances).
63 See Fried, Contractualism,supra note 21, at 45; see also John Broome, Trying
To Value a Life, 9 J. PUB. ECON. 91, 92 (1978) (describing the "paradox" of moral
gridlock).
64 See Keating, PressingPrecaution,supra note 18, at 684.
62
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precaution below (but only just below) the point at which
engaging in a risky activity becomes so costly or burdensome as
to dissuade rational actors from engaging in the activity
altogether, thus jeopardizing its continuation. 5
Two components of the feasibility principle warrant further
explanation: the notion of a socially beneficial activity and the
notion of an activity's long-term viability.
1.

Socially Beneficial Activity

What makes a risky activity "socially beneficial"? And why
restrict my inquiry here to such activities? As noted above, the
type of activities I have in mind are coordinated, repetitive,
actuarially large activities typically undertaken and subsidized
by firms or government agencies that deliver substantial social
benefits. 6 Examples include large-scale construction projects
like the building of bridges, dams, highways, stadiums, and
skyscrapers; public utility initiatives like the generation and
delivery of electric power, gas, and potable water; machine- or
chemical-based factory processes used by firms in manufacturing
goods; clinical drug trials; and vaccination initiatives.
A few observations about this class of activities are in order.
This category excludes risky social practices comprising the
private acts of individuals, such as driving a car on a public road,
using a conventional gas stove in a home kitchen, or walking a
large dog on a leash on a public sidewalk. The reason for
excluding such practices from my inquiry is that their
justifications are usually thought to rest on the risk-bearer's
reciprocal right to directly engage in the practice at issue, and
thereby to impose the same risk on others. 7 By contrast, the
Id. at 685.
See Keating, Social Contract, supra note 25, at 39-41 (contrasting the world
of acts-in which risk impositions are "discrete one-shot events" and the "typical
actor is an individual or a small firm"-with the world of activities-in which "the
typical injury arises not out of the diffuse and disorganized acts of unrelated
individuals or small firms, but out of the organized activities of firms that are either
large themselves, or small parts of relatively well-organized enterprises" and in
which safety costs can typically be spread over many individuals); see also Holmes,
supra note 29, at 467 ("[T]he torts with which our courts are kept busy to-day are
mainly the incidents of certain well known businesses. They are injuries to person or
property by railroads, factories, and the like. The liability for them is estimated, and
sooner or later goes into the price paid by the public.").
67 See, e.g., Keating, Pressing Precaution,supra note 18, at 678 ("The right to
impose risks on others can justify the imposition of equal risks on us by others,
6
6
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activities with which I am concerned here typically impose risks
on persons who do not themselves engage in the activity at issue
and who cannot, therefore, be said to benefit from a reciprocal
right to themselves act in a manner that imposes the associated
risks on others. It will not do, for example, for a large company
to justify the risks its stadium construction project imposes on
passersby by saying, "Well, when a passerby builds her stadium,
she has a right to impose the identical risk on us." I limit my
inquiry here to such non-reciprocal risks.
The category of socially beneficial activities is also meant to
exclude commercially profitable activities that are widely
criminalized, such as the manufacture and distribution of illicit
drugs. 8 Further, that even a non-criminal activity can, in a
modern, free-market economy, be undertaken profitably over a
relatively long period of time does not guarantee that it delivers
substantial social benefits. The production and sale of tobacco
products, for example, has been commercially profitable for
centuries. However, it is questionable whether, given tobacco's
harmful health effects, the activity of cigarette production has
been a socially beneficial one.
For purposes of this Article, I need not draw a precise line
between those activities that count as socially beneficial in the
relevant sense and those that do not. 9 It is sufficient to make
clear that, for the most part, I am concerned with non-criminal,
commercially profitable activities that produce substantial social
benefits. Following Fried, I take activities like those described
because, for example, we may each gain more than we lose from having to bear the
risks created by the presence of other cars on the road.").
"8 I follow Fried in restricting the scope of the inquiry in this way. See Fried,
Limits, supra note 19, at 234-35.

It seems that, like the notion of reasonable precaution, the notion of a socially
beneficial activity could itself be defined either aggregatively (via welfarist
consequentialism) or nonaggregatively (via ex ante contractualism). An aggregative
interpretation would hold roughly that an activity is socially beneficial if and only if
there exists some level of safety precaution at which the activity's aggregate benefits
69

exceed its aggregate costs. A nonaggregative, ex ante contractualist interpretation

would hold roughly that an activity is socially beneficial if and only if there exists
some level of safety precaution at which the benefit it stands to provide to the person
it most benefits exceeds the ex ante burden it places on the person to whom it poses
the gravest risk. An interesting question is how to handle the case in which, at a
given level of precaution, the activity in question would not be socially beneficial in
either an aggregative or a nonaggregative sense. For purposes of this Article, I put

this question to the side and assume that the activity in question remains socially
beneficial overall, whether the IFP or the efficient care standard is followed.
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above, activities as to which there is broad consensus that the
activity is worth preserving, to be prima facie socially
productive.70 The question I explore in this Article is: Assuming
a risky activity is worth preserving, how safe does morality
require that it be made?
2.

Long-Term Viability of Risky Activity

The economic feasibility principle says to reduce a given risk
to the maximum extent possible without threatening the longterm viability of the activity giving rise to the risk.7 1 What
exactly does that mean? Exactly how does one determine how
much expenditure on safety precaution a given activity can
tolerate without being undermined?
The most concrete answers to these questions come from
OSHA, its corresponding regulations, and the cases interpreting
those regulations. One oft-quoted opinion serves as a useful
starting point:
A standard is feasible if it does not threaten 'massive
dislocation' to, or imperil the existence of, the industry. No
matter how initially frightening the projected total or annual
costs of compliance appear, a court must examine those costs in
relation to the financial health and profitability of the industry
and the likely effect of such costs on unit consumer
prices.... [Tihe practical question is whether the standard
threatens the competitive stability of an industry, or whether

any intra-industry or inter-industry discrimination in the
standard might wreck such stability or lead to undue
concentration.72
See Fried, Contractualism,supra note 21, at 41.
Of course, the economically feasible level of precaution must necessarily be
technologically feasible, meaning it must be achievable within the limits of available
technology. In the context of OSHA health regulations, this means that "the typical
firm will be able to develop and install engineering and work practice controls that
can meet the PEL [permissible exposure limits] in most of its operations." United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Obviously,
requiring a degree of safety that is technologically unattainable is inconsistent with
the survival of the activity at issue.
72 Id. at 1265 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted) (quoting
Indus. Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 478, 481 (D.C. Cir. 1974)); see also Am.
Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 531 (1981) (describing OSHA's
determination that the proposed standard for workplace cotton dust exposure was
economically feasible because "although some marginal employers may shut down
rather than comply, the industry as a whole will not be threatened by the capital
requirements of the regulation" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Occupational
71
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In a given case, how do OSHA regulators determine whether
the imposition of a particular standard threatens the competitive
stability of an industry?73 OSHA approaches this question in the
first instance by conducting an industry-by-industry analysis.
For each industry, OSHA determines the percentage of the
industry's revenues and profits that the costs of complying with
the standard represent.7 4 On this point, one OSHA report offers
the following guidance:
[Wihile there is no hard and fast rule, in the absence of evidence
to the contrary OSHA generally considers a standard
economically feasible when the costs of compliance are less than
one percent of revenues. Common-sense considerations indicate

that potential impacts of such a small magnitude are unlikely to
eliminate an industry or significantly alter its competitive
structure particularly since most industries have at least some
ability to raise prices to reflect increased costs .... There is an

enormous variety of year-to-year events that could cause a one
percent increase in a business's costs, e.g., increasing fuel costs,
an unusual one-time expense, changes in costs of materials,
increased rents, increased taxes, etc.75

Exposure to Hexavalent Chromium, 71 Fed. Reg. 10,100, 10,281 (Feb. 28, 2006)
("OSHA's obligation is not to determine whether any plants will close, or whether
some marginal plants may close earlier than they otherwise might have, but
whether the regulation will eliminate or alter the competitive structure of an
industry.").
" It is crucial to note that the economic feasibility principle is committed to
preserving an activity or industry as a whole, not to keeping each and every firm in
a given industry from going bankrupt. Under OSHA's economic feasibility principle,
every firm in a given industry is required to meet the specified risk reduction target,
the one that has been calculated to achieve the maximum reduction in employee risk
consistent with the survival of the industry as a whole. As the authorities cited in
the preceding note make clear, even if meeting that target would drive some
particular firm out of business, the economic feasibility principle tolerates that
result so long as most firms in the industry will be able to meet the target without
going bankrupt.
74See, e.g., Occupational Exposure to Hexavalent Chromium, 71 Fed. Reg. at
10,271-300 (describing results of industry-by-industry analysis of the economic
impact of the proposed permissible exposure limit for hexavalent chromium). For a
critique of the profit-and-revenue method of determining whether a standard
threatens the competitive stability of an industry, see Masur & Posner, supra note
62, at 693-95.
" Occupational Exposure to Hexavalent Chromium, 71 Fed. Reg. at 10,299
(emphasis added). The sort of "standard" at issue in OSHA health regulations is one
that identifies a permissible exposure limit ("PEL") for a particular toxic substance.
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In at least one instance, OSHA concluded that where the
costs of complying with a particular standard come to less than
both one percent of an industry's revenues and ten percent of its
profits, implementation of the standard would not threaten the
competitive stability of the industry.7" The reasoning here seems
to be that if an industry is routinely able to absorb revenue and
profit fluctuations within certain limits without seeing its
competitive stability undermined, then a regulatory standard
whose implementation would cause a revenue or profit
fluctuation within those same limits would not threaten the
industry's competitive stability.7 7
Where a particular industry's compliance costs significantly
exceed the threshold levels designated by OSHA (which are
typically stated as a percentage of the industry's revenues and
profits), OSHA determines on an industry-by-industry basis
whether complying with a particular standard will threaten an
industry's competitive stability. For example, in analyzing the
economic feasibility of proposed permissible exposure limits
("PELs") for hexavalent chromium, OSHA expressed concern
about how a PEL of 1 one [mu] g/m3 would affect the
electroplating industry:
OSHA is concerned about the economic feasibility of the
standard for electroplating at a PEL of 1. At this lower PEL,
costs of the standard represent 2.7 percent of revenues and 65
percent of profits .... It seems unlikely that a price increase of
2.7 percent... would eliminate the industry entirely. OSHA
has concluded, however, that the costs associated with such a
PEL could alter the competitive structure of the industry.
OSHA has concluded this because these costs substantially
exceed the average nominal price increases in the industry, and
the reasons for these nominal price increases-increases in the
cost of labor and energy, for example-will continue. Thus a
price increase that would assure continued profitability for the
entire industry would require almost tripling the annual
nominal price increase .... That would represent a significant
See id. at 10,300 ("The record does not contain evidence that any of the
affected industries for which OSHA found that the costs of complying with the
standard will be less than both one percent of prior revenue and ten percent of prior
profits will in fact be threatened by the standard .... [C]ost changes of less than one
percent are routinely passed on and impacts that are less than 10 percent of profits
have not been shown to be likely to affect the viability or competitive structure of
any of the industries affected by this standard.").
" See id.
7
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real price increase that might not be passed forward,
particularly by older and less profitable segments of the
industry.78
The touchstone of OSHA's analysis here seems to be
ensuring continued profitability, 79 which leads naturally to a
focus on demand elasticity: the extent to which demand for the
industry's product or service will be affected by fluctuations in
price. The less elastic the demand, the more an industry can
pass on compliance costs to consumers without suffering a
reduction in demand and a consequent reduction in
profitability.8 0 Though, in the above case, OSHA concluded that
"demand for electroplating services is relatively inelastic,"
making possible some degree of cost pass-through, it also
concluded that the costs of compliance with the proposed
standard (2.7% of revenues) were too large to be entirely passed
on to consumers in the form of real price increases.8 " The
implication seems to be that compliance with the proposed
standard would mean diminishing electroplating firms' profits so
much as to effectively make electroplating an unprofitable
enterprise. That, OSHA implies, is what is meant by threatening
the "competitive stability" or altering the competitive structure of
82
an industry.
B.

The Individual Risk Principle

The individual risk principle represents an individualized,
nonaggregative version of the efficient care principle; it is
efficient care writ small. While efficient care says to minimize
the sum of aggregate accident costs and aggregate accident
prevention costs, the individual risk principle says to minimize
the sum of each individual risk-bearer's expected accident costs
and each individual precaution cost-bearer's accident prevention
costs. Both principles are marginalist in nature. While efficient
care says to invest in safety until the point at which further
" See id. at 10,301-02.
" See Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 530 n.55 (1981) (holding

cotton dust standard economically feasible because "the industry will maintain longterm profitability and competitiveness").
so Occupational Exposure to Hexavalent Chromium, 71 Fed. Reg. at 10,301.
81 Id.
s2 Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., 452 U.S. at 530 n.55 (quoting United Steelworkers of

Am. v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1265 (D.C. Cir. 1980)) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see supra note 75.
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expenditure would reduce aggregate expected well-being on net,
the individual risk principle says to invest in safety precaution
until the point at which further expenditure would decrease each
cost-bearer's well-being by more than it would increase each riskbearer's expected well-being.83 The individual risk principle
therefore contemplates an individualized "single-4owner""
approach to risk regulation, as it asks how much a person who
"owned" both a pro rata share of safety costs and a pro rata share
of expected accident costs would rationally be willing to invest in
safety precaution.
The individual risk principle sets a moral ceiling beyond
which it is arguably unreasonable to require investment in safety
precaution. The basic idea is this: At least where A and B both
benefit directly and significantly from the risky activity at issue,
one cannot reasonably expect A to accept a setback to her wellbeing (in the form of an increase in the monetary safety costs she
must bear) so that B can avoid a smaller setback to his expected
well-being (in the form of an incremental increase in the risk of
death or serious bodily harm he must bear). To do so would be to
ask A to spend more on safety precautions than B himself would
rationally be willing to spend to protect himself from the risk at
issue (were he in A's economic situation).85
The individual risk principle is, as its name suggests, keyed
to individual risk, the risk borne by each individual risk-bearer.86
Individual risk is ordinarily expressed as the probability (that is,
a 1 in x chance) that an individual will, over the course of a
" These two principles will dictate the identical level of precaution only where
risk-bearers and cost-bearers are perfectly coextensive and homogeneous in all
relevant respects. See infra note 145.
14 See, e.g., Kenneth W. Simons, Deontology, Negligence, Tort, and Crime, 76
B.U. L. REV. 273, 282 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted) (describing a

"'single-owner' conception" of cost-benefit analysis "which asks what the
actor... would do if he owned all the resources in question and would therefore
internalize all the costs and benefits of the decision").
" As discussed in greater detail, see infra Part III.F, the individual risk

principle cap on safety investment is most plausible from a moral point of view in
cases in which the risk-bearers directly and significantly benefit from the risky
activity, for example, as employees or consumers. In cases where those exposed to

the risk at issue do not directly benefit from the risk-imposing activity, it is
somewhat more questionable whether the individual risk principle should set a
moral ceiling on safety investment.
"6 On the distinction between individual risk and population risk, see, for
example, Adler, supra note 17, at 1126 and see also Simons, supra note 18, at 121920.

678

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88:653

particular time period (a year, an average lifetime, and so on),
suffer a particular harm (death, serious injury, and so on). For
example, in the bridge construction hypothetical discussed supra
in the Introduction, each of the two thousand bridge workers is
exposed to a one in two thousand individual risk of a fatal fall
over the course of the five-year project if the safety scaffolding is
used, and a one in one thousand risk if it is not. Notice that
individual risk need not (and typically does not) vary with the
numbers of persons exposed to the risk. If the city suddenly
decided it wanted to double the number of bridge workers, each
of the four thousand workers would still plausibly face a one in
two thousand risk of a fatal fall over the life of the project
(though the risk might be reduced if the increased number of
workers resulted in the bridge being completed in a shorter
period of time).
Individual risk is to be contrasted with population risk,
which represents the number of individuals expected to suffer a
particular harm (death, serious injury, and so on) in a specified
time period. Thus, in the bridge hypothetical, using the safety
netting makes the population risk fall from two expected deaths
to one. Population risk typically does vary with the number of
persons exposed to the risk.17 If the number of workers on the
bridge doubles and the individual risk to each worker remains
the same, the number of expected deaths will double as well.
As discussed in more detail below, because the individual
risk principle is keyed to individual risk rather than population
risk, the level of precaution it requires in a given case is not
directly dependent on the number of persons who bear the risk at
issue or on the number of persons bearing the cost of reducing
the risk. Indeed, the individual risk principle entirely rejects
interpersonal aggregation and avoids summing costs and benefits
across persons altogether. It does, of course, contemplate a
bilateral interpersonal comparison: For a given expenditure on
safety, the individual risk principle compares the monetary cost
of the precaution to each individual cost-bearer against the
resulting increase in safety experienced by each individual risk" It is possible to conceive of situations in which this is not the case, however.
See Sophia Reibetanz, Contractualism and Aggregation, 108 ETHICS 296, 302-03

(1998) (discussing the "Unexploded Mine" hypothetical in which, as the number of
persons exposed to the risk grows, the population risk remains the same (a one
hundred percent chance of one death) and the individual risk falls).
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bearer. But the individual risk principle does not sum precaution
costs (or savings) across all affected cost-bearers, nor does it sum
accident costs (or savings) across all affected risk-bearers.
Another thing to notice about the individual risk principle is
that, unlike the feasibility principle, its application requires
determining the number of distinct individuals who shoulder the
costs of mitigating a particular risk. Without doing so, it would
be impossible to determine the monetary burden borne by each
bearer of precaution costs. Admittedly, in some circumstances,
this may be rather difficult to do. For example, a company
engaged in a risky activity may distribute its safety precaution
costs among a vast group of consumers, shareholders, or some
combination of the two.
Determining the exact share of
precaution costs each individual shareholder or consumer ends
up bearing may be somewhat burdensome.
A further
complication is that, on account of the diminishing marginal
utility of money, the degree to which a specified monetary loss
reduces the well-being of a particular individual will plausibly
depend on the individual's existing wealth, which will vary
significantly from person to person. 8
C.

The Individualized FeasibilityPrinciple

When the economic feasibility principle is conjoined with the
individual risk principle, a bipartite standard emerges: the
individualized feasibility principle. As noted above, the IFP
directs a risk-creating actor to stop investing in safety precaution
only when one of the following two points has been reached:
(1) the point at which further expenditure on safety would
threaten the long-term survival of the activity (economic
feasibility); or (2) the point at which further expenditure would

" In this Article, I largely ignore this complication, but hope to address it in
future work. For my purposes here, I assume that all individuals potentially affected
by a particular risk imposition have identical levels of wealth and thus experience
the identical loss (or gain) in well-being as the result of a given monetary loss (or
gain). Of course, aggregative welfarist theories must confront the same difficulty, as
the aggregate reduction to well-being associated with a particular monetary cost
will, due to the diminishing marginal utility of money, obviously depend on the
existing wealth of each individual responsible for bearing the cost. See Adler, supra

note 11, at 10-15 (explaining how distributionally weighted cost-benefit analysis can
take account of varying levels of individual wealth and the diminishing marginal
utility of money).
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reduce the well-being of each bearer of precaution costs by more
than it would increase the expected well-being of each risk-bearer
(individual risk).
According to the IFP, the risks posed by a socially beneficial
activity should be reduced to the maximum extent consistent
with the activity's long-term survival, unless doing so would
require each cost-bearer to invest more in safety precaution than
a risk-bearer would rationally have been willing to invest in her
own safety, were she in the economic situation of a cost-bearer.
Equivalently, the IFP requires each cost-bearer to make any
investment in risk-reduction that she would rationally have been
willing to make were it her own bodily integrity at risk, up to the
point at which further investment would place the long-term
survival of the activity in jeopardy.
Thus, the IFP implicitly rejects the notion that the only good
comparable in value to the reduction of significant risks of bodily
harm is the preservation of the major, productive activities that
define modern life. 9 By capping precaution at the point dictated
by the individual risk principle, the IFP implies that incremental
changes in the monetary costs borne by each individual who
subsidizes safety precaution can meaningfully be traded against
incremental changes in the risks of serious bodily harm borne by
each individual risk-bearer. If a given reduction in risk is
sufficiently costly for each cost-bearer and sufficiently small for
each risk-bearer, the IFP holds it morally indefensible to require
the reduction, even if doing so would not threaten the survival of
the underlying activity. However, by simultaneously capping
precaution at the economic feasibility point, the IFP
accommodates the intuition that, in the context of socially
beneficial activity, the reasonable level of precaution can never
be one which is so stringent as to make the activity unviable.
" Keating sometimes suggests that one individual's certain monetary loss (or
gain) is fundamentally incomparable to-and cannot fairly be traded against-an
increase (or reduction) in the low but significant risk of death or serious bodily harm
borne by another individual. See, e.g., Keating, Pressing Precaution,supra note 18,

at 664-74 (discussing the comparability of trivial monetary losses and gains with
devastating bodily injuries). As noted in the main text, I disagree with this view.
One can coherently subscribe to the comparability of monetary losses (or gains) and

changes in one's risk of serious bodily harm without also subscribing to the view that
a trivial monetary gain, summed across a vast number of individuals, can justify the
imposition of a greater risk of death on a distinct and much smaller group of
individuals.

Keating sometimes

aggregability in this way.

seems

to me to conflate

comparability

and
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The IFP caps investment in safety short of the level required by
the individual risk principle if this is necessary to preserve the
underlying socially beneficial activity.
1.

Does the IFP Lead to Morally Implausible Results?

One implication of the IFP is that the level of precaution
morally required with respect to a particular risk is not directly
dependent on the number of persons exposed to that risk. Unlike
the efficient care principle, neither the economic feasibility
principle nor the individual risk principle is directly sensitive to
the size of the population exposed to the risk. The underlying
thought is that the degree of protection to which each risk-bearer
is morally entitled should not directly depend on how many other
persons also happen to be exposed to the risk. 1
Is this
defensible? Should reasonable precaution be keyed to both the
individual risk borne by each risk-bearer and the number of risk92
bearers?
In many cases, it seems somewhat implausible that the
necessary level of precaution should be a direct function of the
number of persons exposed to the risk. Should a bus driver use
greater care when the bus is full of passengers than when it is
empty save for one or two?93 Should a high-rise apartment
building be constructed to keep its occupants safer than
occupants of a single-family dwelling, simply because more
people are at risk in the high-rise?9 4 A number of commentators
have answered questions like these in the negative.9

" See Adler, supra note 17, at 1240-41 (noting that many regulatory standards
in the United States are insensitive to population size and keyed to individual risk
only).
91 See Oberdiek, supra note 55, at 144 ("[N]o difference can be justified in the
relative care taken in constructing buildings that serve differing numbers of people.
Since each person stands the same probability of suffering a like harm-since each
person in either kind of structure runs the same risk-each person is entitled ... to
the same level of precaution or the same standard of care.").
92 See id. ("[U]nder
the Hand test, greater care must be taken in the
construction of apartment high-rises than single-family homes since so many more
could suffer significant harm if, say, the apartment building's foundation faltered.").
See Simons, supra note 18, at 1174.
4 See John Oberdiek, The Ethics in Risk Regulation: Towards a Contractualist
Re-Orientation,36 RUTGERs L.J. 199, 203-04 (2004).
" See id.; Simons, supra note 18, at 1174-75; cf. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE,
supra note 28, at 236.
£3
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On the other hand, a standard's lack of direct sensitivity to
population size might imply that whether ten workers or ten
thousand workers are exposed to a particular workplace risk,
each worker's risk must be reduced by the identical amount.9 If
a one in one thousand risk of death falls on each individual
worker, the risk can be expected to result in ten deaths in the
latter case, but only a one percent chance of a single death in the
former. To some commentators, it has seemed implausible to
require no greater reduction of each worker's risk in the ten
thousand-worker case than in the ten-worker case. 7
Notice, however, that under the IFP, the requisite level of
precaution may indirectly depend on the size of the population
exposed to the risk. For example, as practiced by OSHA, the
economic feasibility principle specifies a particular PEL for each
worker that must be satisfied by all firms within a particular
industry. It seems likely that the more at-risk employees a firm
has, the more it will need to invest to satisfy this uniform
standard. For example, the total safety investment necessary to
reduce each worker's individual risk of death from one in one
thousand to one in seven hundred and fifty would likely be
significantly greater in the case of a ten thousand-worker factory
than in the case of a ten-worker factory. 9 Thus, under the
9 For example, in setting permissible exposure limits for hazardous substances
under the economic feasibility standard, OSHA designates a PEL that applies

regardless of the number of workers at risk in a given firm, industry, or group of
industries. See, e.g., Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 501-04 (1981)

(describing OSHA's setting a PEL for cotton dust exposure without regard for
population size). Of course, achieving the identical reduction in each worker's
individual risk may well require a different per-worker
depending on the number of workers exposed to the risk.

safety

expenditure

11 See, e.g., Adler, supra note 17, at 1241 (calling it "morally arbitrary" to
require identical reduction in individual risk without regard to the number of riskbearers).
9" See supra note 96.
" In correspondence concerning this Article, I interpreted Barbara Fried to

express skepticism about the truth of this proposition in light of one-time set-up
costs and economies of scale. I continue to believe the proposition is generally
correct, however. An analogy to building safety may be helpful to explain why. It is
obvious that the total investment required to guarantee the structural integrity of a
20-floor, 200-unit apartment building is much greater than that necessary to
guarantee the structural integrity of a single-family home. The reason for this is
that the apartment building is designed to house many more people than the single

family home, so must of necessity be much larger and taller than the home. This
illustrates how the total safety investment required to provide an identical level of

safety to each risk-bearer will often vary directly with the number of risk-bearers. Of
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economic feasibility principle, the greater the number of persons
at risk, the more each cost-bearer will likely be required to invest
in safety precautions. It seems to me that the intuition driving
Adler and other commentators critical of precautionary
standards keyed to individual risk is that, when a risk imposition
can be expected to cause ten deaths, morality compels us to do
more than when a risk imposition merely creates a one percent
chance of a single death, even if both risk impositions are
identical with respect to the individual risk borne by each riskbearer. Insofar as it tends to require a greater total safety
expenditure when more people are at risk, the economic
feasibility principle accommodates this intuition.
Under the individual risk principle, the relationship between
the requisite level of precaution and the number of persons at
risk is more complicated. Whereas the economic feasibility
principle requires the identical reduction in individual risk
without regard to the number of risk-bearers, under the
individual risk principle, the requisite reduction in individual
risk may itself be affected by an increase in either the number of
cost-bearers, since this will necessarily reduce each cost-bearer's
share of precaution costs, or the number of risk-bearers, since
this will likely raise the cost of reducing each risk-bearer's
individual risk of harm. The individual risk principle is keyed to
the marginal tradeoff between each cost-bearer's share of safety
precaution costs and each risk-bearer's individual risk. As the
number of persons exposed to the risk grows, the marginal riskreducing efficacy of each dollar spent on safety precaution will
plausibly change. For example, the first $100,000 spent on safety
precautions at a ten-worker factory would almost certainly
reduce each worker's individual risk by more than the first
$100,000 spent on safety precautions at a ten thousand-worker
factory. Further, the point at which further expenditure on
safety precaution would produce no appreciable reduction in each
worker's risk would likely be reached sooner in the case of a tenworker factor than in that of a ten thousand-worker factory. For
these reasons, and holding the number of cost-bearers constant,

course, Fried could be correct that, in view of one-time set-up costs and economies of
scale, the per-risk-bearersafety investment may stay the same or even decrease as
the number of risk-bearers increases. But my point in the main text relates to the
total, rather than per-risk-bearer, investment in safety precautions.
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an increase in the number of risk-bearers may dictate a greater,
smaller, or equal pro rata investment in safety precautions,
depending on the circumstances.
To the extent the IFP's lack of direct sensitivity to the size of
the risk-bearing population seems morally implausible, it is
critical to bear in mind that aggregative interpretations of
reasonable precaution are not without their own counterintuitive
implications. As the suspension bridge hypothetical discussed
supra in the Introduction makes clear, summing costs and
benefits across persons can lead to results that conflict
dramatically with widely-held moral convictions. Indeed, no
extant theory of reasonable precaution that I am aware of has
the virtue of delivering results that accord perfectly with moral
intuitions in all situations. If it is implausible to regard the
imposition of a one in one thousand risk of death on ten people as
requiring the same regulatory response as the imposition of the
same risk on ten thousand people, it seems no less implausible to
regard the imposition of a fifty percent risk of death on two
people and the imposition of a one in one million risk of death on
one million people as morally indistinguishable on the grounds
that both can be expected to result in the death of a single
person. Even granting that the IFP may generate implausible
results in certain situations, these results seem no more
implausible to me than those associated with aggregative
precautionary standards like efficient care.

III. A CONTRACTUALIST JUSTIFICATION FOR THE IFP
I have so far argued that the individualized feasibility
principle represents a viable alternative to efficient care. Like
efficient care, it is a substantive interpretation of reasonable
precaution that is capable of delivering precise guidance
concerning the requisite level of precaution in specific cases.
Unlike efficient care, the IFP is capable of accommodating the
intuition that, where risks are concentrated on a group of persons
that is a small fraction of the size of the group among whom
precaution costs are spread, acting reasonably may require
investing more in safety precaution than is marginally costjustified.
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In this Part, I explore the theoretical underpinnings of the
IFP. If the efficient care standard is straightforwardly grounded
in utilitarianism's directive to maximize aggregate well-being,0 0
what is the theoretical justification for the IFP? Given that the
IFP typically dictates a level of precaution that does not optimize
aggregate well-being, its theoretical grounding is not surprisingly
found generally in nonconsequentialism, and specifically in a
relatively new nonconsequentialist theory of normative ethics
known as ex ante contractualism. In this Part, I argue that if the
morality of risk imposition is determined from the standpoint of
ex ante contractualism, the risks posed by socially beneficial
activity should be mitigated to the extent required by the
individualized feasibility principle.
A.

Contractualism'sCore Ideas

Contractualism is a theory of normative ethics introduced by
the philosopher T.M. Scanlon in 1982.101 It is not a general
theory of morality, but rather a theory of interpersonal morality
or, to use Scanlon's famous phrase, of "what we owe to each
other.110 2 From its inception, contractualism has purported to
represent an alternative to utilitarianism and, in particular, to
embody an argument against the core utilitarian tenet that all
moral questions reduce to questions about the consequences of
acts (or rules) for the aggregate well-being of all affected
individuals. °3
Contractualism offers the following formula for determining
the rightness or wrongness of a particular act: "[A]n act is wrong
if its performance under the circumstances would be disallowed
by any set of principles for the general regulation of behavior
that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed,
...See Oberdiek, supra note 55, at 143 ("The Hand test is essentially a
consequentialist handmaiden, based on justification to the world at large and
envisaging interpersonal aggregation of burdens and benefits.").
101 See Scanlon, Contractualism,supra note 28, at 103. See generally SCANLON,
WHAT WE OWE, supra note 28.
102 Thus, contractualism does not directly address questions of political
morality, that is, the moral strictures applicable to the actions and policies of
coercive institutions, nor does it address our moral obligations to animals or future
persons. Cf. ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LAW 5 (1999)

(noting that political morality, "the morality governing the exercise of force, has its
own standards of responsibility that may well be out of place in other moral
contexts").
103 Scanlon, Contractualism,supra note 28, at 103.
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unforced general agreement."1 °4 What exactly does that mean?
And in what sense is this formula supposed to represent an
alternative to utilitarianism?
The contractualist formula involves three component claims.
The first claim is that interpersonal morality presupposes the
requirement of justifiability to each affected person considered as
an individual, rather than the requirement of justifiability to all
affected persons considered in the aggregate. °5 The second claim
is that the moral status of a particular act (its rightness or
wrongness) is a function of the moral validity of the general
principle licensing the act. 0 6 Tying together the first two claims,
the third claim is that a principle is justifiable to each person if
and only if it would command the free assent of all persons, that
is, if and only if no person could reasonably reject it as a principle
for the general regulation of behavior. 0 7
Thus, under
contractualism, an act is morally permissible if and only if no one
could reasonably reject the general principle permitting the act.
When, according to contractualism, can a principle be
reasonably rejected?
The concept underlying the notion of
reasonable rejectability is the minimax criterion."°8 Among a set
of candidate principles, the nonrejectable principle P is the one of
which the following is true: The strongest complaint any person
could make against P, were P generally accepted, is weaker than
the strongest complaint that could be made against every other
alternative principle.0 9 As Scanlon puts it, "[S]omeone can
reasonably reject a principle if there is some alternative to which
no other person has a complaint that is as strong."11 0 The
principle no one could reasonably reject is the principle that,
104

SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE, supra note 28, at 153.

Id. at 153 n.8 ("What is basic to contractualism as I understand it is the idea
of justifiability to each person (on grounds that he or she could not reasonably
reject).").
10'

10' Scanlon writes:

To justify an action to others is to offer reasons supporting it and to claim
that they are sufficient to defeat any objections that others may have. To do
this, however, is also to defend a principle, namely one claiming that such
reasons are sufficient grounds for so acting under the prevailing conditions.
Id. at 197.
107 Id. at 189.

'0'I follow Sophia Reibetanz in using the minimax criterion to explain the
notion of reasonable rejectability. See Reibetanz, supra note 87, at 300 (describing
the "Minimax Complaint Model" of reasonable rejectability).
109

Id.

110 SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE, supra note 28, at 229.
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among a set of candidate principles, minimizes the strength of
the complaint that could be lodged by the maximally burdened
person.1 11 Supposing I am the person that would be most
burdened by general acceptance of a particular principle, I still
cannot reasonably reject that principle if every alternative
principle would, if generally accepted, impose a greater burden
on someone else.
Contractualism thus contemplates a rejectability inquiry, the
goal of which is to identify the principle satisfying the minimax
criterion. This is a fundamentally comparative inquiry that
takes into account not only the extent to which general
acceptance of each candidate principle burdens each affected
person in an absolute sense, but also the differential each person
experiences in the burdens they would bear under the respective
principles. 11 2 That is,supposing A is the most burdened party
under Principle P-1 and B the most burdened party under
Principle P-2, we ask not only if A's burden under Principle P-I is
weightier than B's burden under Principle P-2, but also if A's
gain in moving from P-1 to P-2 is more significant than B's gain
in moving from P-2 to P-1. The question to be asked, in other
words, is whether it would be unreasonable for A to refuse to
accept the burden she must bear under P-1 in order that B can
enjoy the benefit she must relinquish under P-2." 3
...Applying the minimax rule to complaints is equivalent to applying the more
familiar "maximin" rule to outcomes for individual well-being. Cf RAWLS, supra note
19, at 133 ("The maximin rule tells us to rank alternatives by their worst possible
outcomes: we are to adopt the alternative the worst outcome of which is superior to
the worst outcomes of the others.").
112 See Reibetanz, supra note 87, at 299 (stating that in the rejectability inquiry,
"we take a person's complaint about a principle to be a function both of her absolute
level of well-being under acceptance of that principle and of the burden which
acceptance of that principle imposes upon her (that is, the amount by which she
would be worse off under acceptance of that principle than under acceptance of some
alternative)"); Scanlon, Contractualism,supra note 28, at 113 ("Whether it would be
unreasonable for me to reject a certain principle, given the aim of finding principles
which no one with this aim could reasonably reject, depends not only on how much
actions allowed by that principle might hurt me in absolute terms but also on how
that potential loss compares with other potential losses to others under this
principle and alternatives to it.").
13 See Scanlon, Contractualism, supra note 28, at 123. For example, suppose
that under P-i, A's well-being is 150 and B's 101, and that under P-2, A's well-being
is 102 and B's 103. The mere fact that the loser under P-2 (A) is slightly better off
than the loser under P-1 (B) does not necessarily mean that P-2 is the nonrejectable
principle satisfying the minimax criterion. This is because A might plausibly be
taken to have a stronger complaint with P-2 being chosen over P-1 than B would
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To make this all a bit more concrete, consider how
contractualism would determine whether it is morally
permissible to lie to someone threatening to wrongfully harm
another person. To work with a specific example, suppose that,
while he is robbing me at gunpoint late one night, the robber
demands to know where I live. In response, I tell him that I do
not live in the immediate area, when in fact I live a few houses
away. I do so because I wish to protect my sleeping family from
danger and my household possessions from theft. Is my lie
morally permissible?
Per contractualism, my act of lying under these
circumstances is morally permissible only if it would be allowed
by a general behavioral principle that no one could reasonably
reject. Rejecting as implausible a principle granting categorical
permission to lie to others, consider two alternative principles:
(1) Qualified Permission To Lie: It is permissible to lie to
another person when the person is threatening to wrongfully
harm someone and when lying reduces the likelihood that the
person will succeed in wrongfully harming them; (2) Categorical
Prohibition on Lying: It is never permissible to lie to another
person. The question is: Which of these principles satisfies the
minimax criterion? Which principle imposes a lighter burden on
the person it burdens most heavily?
The persons most burdened by general acceptance of the
Qualified Permission principle would, it seems, be those on the
receiving end of the sanctioned lies.
Those threatening to
wrongfully harm others might complain that, notwithstanding
their own wrongful conduct, being lied to shows them disrespect
or diminishes their well-being in some respect. On the other
hand, the persons most burdened by general acceptance of the
Categorical Prohibition principle would, it seems, be persons
forced to divulge truthful information to those bent on using such
information to wrongfully perpetrate serious harm, as well as
persons placed at increased risk of being wrongfully harmed as
the result of such compelled disclosures.

have with P-1 being chosen over P-2. Why? Because it would arguably be
unreasonable for B to refuse to accept a two-unit (roughly two percent) reduction in
well-being in order that A can enjoy a 49-unit (roughly fifty percent) increase in wellbeing.

REASONABLE PRECA UTION

2014]

The question then becomes: Who bears the greater burden?
Those would-be wrongful actors on the receiving end of the lies
permitted by the Qualified Permission, or those placed at
increased risk of suffering wrongful harm as a result of the
truthful disclosures compelled by the Categorical Prohibition? It
seems obvious that the latter group bears the far greater burden.
The German citizen forced to truthfully disclose to a group of
Nazi officers that she is hiding a Jewish family in her cellar, and
the Jewish family likely to be wrongfully harmed as a result of
the disclosure, no doubt have a stronger complaint with the
Categorical Prohibition than the robber in the above example has
with the Qualified Permission. In other words, it seems clear
that persons like the German citizen or the Jewish family could
reasonably refuse to accept the burden they must bear under the
Categorical Prohibition so that persons like the robber or the
Nazi officers can enjoy the benefits they would have to give up
under the Qualified Permission. Thus, the Qualified Permission
To Lie is not reasonably rejectable.
Because that principle
licenses my lying to the robber under the circumstances, that act
is morally permissible.
One of the most distinctive features of contractualism is its
pluralism concerning the types of reasons that carry weight in
moral reasoning. In Scanlon's view, a person can reasonably
reject a candidate principle not only in virtue of its consequences
for the person's well-being, but also in virtue of its consistency (or
lack thereof) with the person's rights, entitlements, or, as the
self-defense example illustrates, fairness interests.1 14
Thus,
contractualism is properly considered a nonconsequentialist
moral theory, since it holds that the moral permissibility of an
act may properly depend on factors other than the consequences
of the act (or its licensing principle) for individuals' well-being."
Another critically important feature of contractualism is
what has been termed its individualistrestriction, "its insistence
that the justifiability of a moral principle depends only on
various individuals' reasons for objecting to that principle and
alternatives to it. '116
In other words, according to the
114

See SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE, supra note 28, at 229 (discussing the ways in

which his version of contractualism eschews the welfarism of the so-called
Complaint Model).
" Id. at 203.
11.

See id. at 229.
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individualist restriction, the strength of a complaint lodged
against a particular principle can never be a function of the sum
of different individuals' gain (or loss) in well-being under that
principle as compared with some alternative principle.
Contractualism instead contemplates a series of "pairwise
comparisons ' in which one representative individual's burden
under a particular principle is compared to one other
representative individual's burden under an alternative
principle."' 8 I adhere to the individualist restriction here because
doing so ensures that the precautionary decision rule that
emerges from my contractualist analysis will be genuinely
nonaggregative, thereby respecting the separateness of persons
in a way interpersonally aggregative standards do not.
B. A Dilemma for Contractualism?
With the basics of contractualism in place, we can now move
to Fried's critique of a contractualist approach to risk regulation.
In her view, contractualism necessarily fails to generate a viable
interpretation of reasonable precaution that differs meaningfully
from efficient care or other interpretations founded on
interpersonal aggregation." 9
Her reasoning for this conclusion takes the form of a
dilemma. The dilemma emerges from consideration of the two
alternative epistemic points of view-the ex ante and the ex
post-from which candidate principles could be evaluated in
contractualism's rejectability inquiry. These two points of view
represent alternative assumptions about the type and extent of
information available concerning how each affected individual
fares under the candidate principles.
Under ex ante contractualism, candidate principles are
evaluated based on their expected outcomes for each affected
individual's well-being. 20 This would mean that the rejectability
117 See Reibetanz, supra note 87, at 300 (explaining that under contractualism,
"we determine whether an individual could reasonably reject some principle by
making a series of pairwise comparisons: each person's complaint about that
principle is compared separately with the complaint of every other person").
IYd.
119 Fried, Contractualism,supra note 21, at 61.
120 See James, supra note 55, at 266 ("Let us call ex ante contractualism
the... view that only expected outcomes count as grounds for complaint or objection
(including expected outcomes of a principle's general adoption) mounted on behalf of
each potentially affected party from some specified epistemic position.").
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inquiry would be based on probabilistic data about each
individual's expected fate under each precautionary principle,
that is, her likelihood of suffering death or serious injury from
the risks the principle tolerates, the size of her expected benefit
from the risky activities the principle sanctions (or prohibits), the
amount of the monetary costs she would be expected to bear
under the principle, and so on.121
Under ex post contractualism, on the other hand, candidate
principles are evaluated based on their actual outcomes for each
individual's well-being. 122 In this case, the rejectability inquiry
would be based on data about each individual's actual fate under
each precautionary principle, including, most saliently, whether
she ends up being killed, seriously injured, or left unharmed by
the risks the principle tolerates.
With the ex ante/ex post distinction in mind, Fried's dilemma
can be stated as follows: If possible precautionary standards are
evaluated from an ex post point of view, contractualism will
implausibly deem impermissible most forms of socially beneficial,
though significantly risky, conduct.1 23
If a precautionary
standard tolerates a risk that results in the death of even a
single person, that standard could, it seems, be reasonably
rejected, since no person will have a stronger complaint than one
based on the loss of life. 124 As James puts it, "Complaints of
death will always carry the day. 1 2 Thus, if the ex post point of
view governs, any risky activity that has any probability of
resulting in the death of at least one person will be impermissible
according to contractualism, since there will be at least one
person who could reasonably reject the principle that allows the
activity to go forward. But this would bar all sorts of risky
activities-large-scale construction projects, and so on-which,

121

Id. at 284.

122

See id. at 266 ("Let us call ex post contractualismthe view that we should

evaluate what decision is reasonably acceptable only in light of its actual outcomes
as they actually unfold over time.").
123 Id. at 265.
124 See Fried, Contractualism,supra note 21, at 44 (noting that, under ex post
contractualism, "any principle that authorizes actions that risk gravely harming at
least one person will be rejected by the hypothetical representative person who, by

happenstance or by being permitted to peek ahead, learns she will be the unlucky
one").
121 James, supra note 55, at 272.
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assuming reasonable precautions are taken, seem intuitively
acceptable, notwithstanding that they are certain to result in the
accidental loss of life and limb.126
If, on the other hand, the contractualist inquiry assesses
precautionary standards from an ex ante point of view, it will, in
Fried's view, end up settling on a standard that is
indistinguishable from the sort of interpersonally aggregative
decision rule preferred by consequentialists:
If representative persons are imagined to choose general
principles from an ex ante POV, each will prefer the principles
that optimize her expected subjective value, given her ex ante
preferences, circumstances, etc. Assuming a plausible range of
risk aversion and altruism, a normal distribution of preferences
about outcomes and evenly distributed upside and downside

risks, the principles that optimize a given individual's expected
position will be roughly equivalent to the principles that
optimize aggregate well-being. (To put it another way, under
conditions of uncertainty, optimal individual choice tends to
converge with optimal social choice.) Thus,
we end up with an
127
aggregative solution by a different route.
According
to
Fried,
if
contractualism
evaluates
precautionary principles from the ex ante standpoint, it will
settle on roughly the same decision rule as that favored by
aggregative welfarists: Take all and only those precautions that
are marginally cost-justified, summing costs and benefits across
persons.1 2 This implies that, if contractualists adopt the ex ante

126 See id. at 268-72 (arguing that ex post contractualism results in "moral
gridlock," that is, a ban on virtually all socially beneficial but risky activities
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
127 Fried, Contractualism, supra note 21, at 43-44 (emphasis added). Fried's
analysis here is importantly limited by the assumption described in the language I
have italicized. If "upside and downside risks" are truly evenly distributed, then
Fried is correct that a representative individual could reasonably reject any
precautionary standard that failed to optimize aggregate well-being. The problem is
that the risks posed by a socially beneficial activity rarely fall evenly on the
individuals they fall on and, even more critically, there is often incomplete overlap
between the set of individuals who bear the "downside" risks of the activity, the set
of individuals who stand to benefit from the activity-those who bear the activity's
"upside" risks-and the set of individuals who bear the costs of reducing the
downside risks. For example, in the safety netting case discussed supra in the
Introduction, the workers who bear the risks of the bridge construction project will
neither benefit from the project nor bear a share of its safety precaution costs. Thus,
in such a case, risk and benefits are not evenly distributed.
121

Id. at 39-41 & n.3.
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point of view, they forfeit the capacity to explain why pressing
precaution beyond the point of cost-justification can be morally
obligatory.
Thus, Fried thinks that contractualism either yields the
same decision rule favored by aggregative welfarists or imposes
an implausible ban on most risky, socially beneficial activity.
"The basic problem facing contractualists," she opines, "is that
adopting an ex ante POV proves too little and adopting an ex
post POV proves too much. 129
C.

Ex Ante Contractualismand Generic Reasons
Fried can generate an ostensible dilemma only by relying on
an inadequately nuanced description of the epistemic position
from which complaints would be lodged under ex ante
contractualism. When ex ante contractualism is made sensitive
to asymmetries in the distribution of risks, costs, and benefits
among different individuals, ex ante contractualism can indeed
yield a substantive decision rule for safety precaution that
diverges from efficient care and other aggregative standards.1 3 °
In her description of ex ante contractualism, Fried builds in
assumptions that effectively efface the real-world distributional
differences of which contractualism is designed to take account.
Although she seems to recognize that the subjective preferences
and circumstances of the complainants in the rejectability
inquiry will vary, by stipulating an "even[] distribut[ion] [ofi
upside and downside risks," 3 ' she assumes away the single most
important manner in which circumstances will and do in fact
vary in the context of risk regulation.
In the real world,
particular risks posed by particular activities often fall unevenly
on the people on whom they fall. 3 2 Even more critically, some

129

Id. at 43; see James, supra note 55, at 265 ("[1]f contractualism allows ex post

objections by considering actual outcomes, it becomes difficult to justify the risks
created by most public policy, leaving contractualism at odds with moral
commonsense in much the way utilitarianism is. But if contractualism instead takes
a fully ex ante form by considering only expected outcomes, it becomes unclear how it
is supposed to recommend something other than aggregative cost-benefit decisionmaking.").
13 See James, supra note 55, at 266 ("[Fried's] dilemma nevertheless fails on its
second

horn:

suitably

elaborated,

an 'ex

ante contractualism'

constrains aggregative cost-benefit decision-making.").

131 Fried, Contractualism,supra note 21, at 43-44.
132 See James, supra note 55, at 278, 283.
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risks are borne by beneficiaries of the activity at issue (such as
workers or consumers), whereas other risks are borne chiefly by
non-beneficiaries (such as bystanders). 133 Some risks are borne
primarily by persons who also bear a portion of the costs of
reducing those same risks (many consumption risks), whereas, as
the suspension bridge hypothetical illustrates, other risks are
borne chiefly by persons who do not bear any appreciable share of
those costs (most workplace risks). 134 Such morally relevant
asymmetries in the way risks and benefits can be distributed
among different groups of people are negated in Fried's
treatment of ex ante contractualism.
Fried does briefly discuss a case in which an activity's risks
and benefits are distributed unevenly among the affected
individuals.1 31 She considers a case in which the efficient course
of action would be to site a toxic waste dump in an area where
land values are lowest, Poorville.1 3 ' Because of their proximity to
the dump, Poorville residents bear a disproportionately high
health risk. 137
Is this decision morally defensible?
Fried
considers three ways in which it might be made so: (1) provide
cash compensation to Poorville residents; (2) give risk-bearers a
veto over whether the risky activity should proceed at all; or
(3) justify the efficient course of action to Poorville residents by
"bundling" risks together, such that the risks posed by the dump
1 38
are offset by the benefit provided by other, similar risks.
Notably absent from Fried's consideration is the possibility of
siting the dump in the location where it poses the lowest risk to
human health. Assuming all possible dump locations pose the
identical risk to human health (which seems rather unlikely as a
practical matter), is it morally defensible to site the dump in
Poorville on account of its having the smallest possible effect on
property values? From a contractualist perspective, it seems not.
It seems the only fair principle to follow in such circumstances
would be to choose the site randomly and to compensate the
residents living close to the site in an amount sufficient to allow
each of them to relocate, if they wish. This may lead to an
133
134
13
13
137
13s

See
See
See
See
See
See

id. at 285.
id.
Fried, Contractualism,supra note 21, at 56-58.
id. at 56-57.
id.
id. at 57-58.
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inefficient result (for example, if a site in a rich neighborhood is
the one randomly selected for the dump), but it seems to me to be
the only course of action that no one could reasonably reject. A
principle allowing siting decisions to be made on the basis of
property values, if generally accepted and applied repeatedly
over time, would likely result in a disproportionate share of toxic
dumps and other hazardous operations being sited in poor
neighborhoods, placing a resident of such a neighborhood at a
disproportionately high risk of harm. This, it seems to me, would
give someone who lives in a poor neighborhood a basis for
reasonably rejecting such a principle in favor of a principle
dictating a random or proportionate siting policy.
Let us return to the question of how one might use ex ante
contractualism to generate a distinct interpretation of reasonable
precaution. The question that must be confronted is how to use
ex ante contractualism in a way that takes account of the morally
relevant differences in how costs, risks, and benefits can be
distributed among distinct groups of persons.
I believe the beginning of an answer lies in Scanlon's notion
of generic reasons. According to Scanlon, contractualism's
rejectability inquiry is to be conducted neither from the
perspective of a hypothetical "average" person nor from the
perspective of specific individuals.13 9
Scanlon instead
contemplates an intermediate perspective, in which complaints
are based on "reasons that we can see that people have in virtue
of their situation, characterized in general terms, and such
things as their aims and capabilities and the conditions in which
14 Scanlon terms these "[g]eneric reasons."141
'
they are placed.""
Generic reasons include reasons based on desires or goals
that could plausibly be attributed to all persons. "We commonly
take it," Scanlon observes, "that people have strong reasons to
want to avoid bodily injury, to be able to rely on assurances they
are given, and to have control over what happens to their own
bodies. 142 However, as the definition quoted in the previous
paragraph suggests, a rejectability inquiry based on generic
reasons is also meant to take account of differences in people's
situations and of the way these differences would presumably
SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE, supra note 28, at 202-04.
14 Id. at 204.
139

141
142

Id.
Id.
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affect their willingness to endorse candidate principles. Scanlon
explicitly acknowledges this: "Not everyone is affected by a given
principle in the same way, and generic reasons are not limited to
reasons that the majority of people have. '"143
This suggests that, in evaluating principles governing the
level of precaution to be exercised when engaging in a socially
beneficial activity that poses a significant risk of serious harm,
we need to consider the most salient respects in which people can
be differently situated with respect to a particular risk posed by a
particular activity. There are three key respects in which people
can be so differently situated: (1) the extent to which they benefit
from the activity; (2) the extent to which they bear the risk at
issue; and (3) the extent to which they bear the cost of safety
precautions that reduce that risk. 144 This implies that we need to
evaluate risks from at least three different perspectives: the
perspective of those who benefit from the activity at issue, the
perspective of those who bear the activity's risks, and the
perspective of those who bear the costs of safety precautions that
reduce those risks.
Only in rare circumstances will these three groups overlap
perfectly.1 4 For example, as the suspension bridge hypothetical
illustrates, most workplace risks are borne by persons (workers)
who do not bear the costs of reducing those risks through safety
precautions. Workers generally do not enjoy the cost savings
that result from leaving certain workplace safety precautions
143 Id. at 204-05. Scanlon goes on to observe, "If even a small number of people

would be adversely affected by a general permission for agents to act a certain way,
then this gives rise to a potential reason for rejecting that principle." Id. at 205.
144 See James, supra note 55, at 275.
145 When they do-that is, when the

identical group of persons realizes the
benefits of a risky activity, bears the activity's risks, and bears the costs of
mitigating those risks, and when benefits, risks, and costs are evenly distributed
throughout that group-then Fried is correct that ex ante contractualism would
dictate taking the same level of precaution as that dictated by the efficient care
principle. If all participants in the rejectability inquiry are, by hypothesis,
identically situated with respect to the risk at issue and if all relevant risks,
benefits, and costs are evenly distributed, then the only principle that is justifiable
to each participant is the principle that maximizes the average well-being of all

participants. Every other principle is rejectable because, compared with the efficient
care principle, they leave each affected person worse off. James appears to be in

agreement on this point. See id. at 278 (acknowledging that an "aggregative 'rule' of
social choice" would be "justified" under ex ante contractualism in cases where
"everyone potentially affected has roughly the same ex ante prospects of benefit" and
"no one can otherwise mount a reasonablepersonal objection").
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untaken.
Those savings tend to accrue to consumers or
shareholders or some combination of the two.14 The same could
be said of socially productive activities that pose environmental
risks to bystanders. The person exposed to a heightened cancer
risk as a result of living next to a cement factory that emits toxic
fumes into the air bears that risk without also bearing the costs
of safety precautions that reduce it (or realizing the savings
associated with leaving such precautions left untaken). Thus, in
many cases, there will be little overlap between those exposed to
the risk at issue and those who bear the costs of reducing the risk
through the exercise of safety precautions.
It seems that,
contrary to Fried's claim, upside and downside risks are quite
often not evenly distributed.
Thus, following James and Keating,14 7 I here deploy an ex
ante contractualism that evaluates candidate principles based on
the generic reasons that risk-bearers, cost-bearers, and
beneficiaries would have to object to those principles in light of
their expected outcomes.
D. Well-Being, Willingness-To-Accept, and Willingness-To-Pay
Under ex ante contractualism, candidate principles are
evaluated based on their expected outcomes for individuals' wellbeing. I need to say something about the particular conception of
well-being that I rely on in evaluating candidate precautionary
standards.
The ex ante contractualism I deploy here presupposes the
coherence of interpersonal comparisons of levels of well-being
and further undertakes to quantify gains and losses to
individuals' respective levels of well-being in terms of
148
willingness-to-accept ("WTA") and willingness-to-pay ("WTP").
146 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 32 ("[T]he risks and benefits of a consumer
product accrue to the same party, the consumer, who can choose to avoid the risk.
Employees, on the other hand, rarely have such a choice-they must bear the risk of
occupational health hazards, while benefits accrue largely to employers and
consumers." (quoting Brief for Federal Respondent at 55, Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst. v.

Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981) (Nos. 79-1429 and 79-1583)) (internal quotation marks

omitted)).
147

See James, supra note 55, at 274 (endorsing ex ante contractualism over ex

post contractualism or a hybrid ex ante-ex post contractualism); Keating, Pressing
Precaution, supra note 18, at 674-84 (implicitly relying on an ex ante version of

social contract theory).
14s Most social welfare theorists take the coherence of interpersonal comparisons
of levels of well-being for granted. See, e.g., ADLER, supra note 10, at xv-xvi, 185-
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WTA and WTP together embody a preference-based, monetary
conception of well-being, one that is typically used in CBA.149
WTA refers to the minimum amount of money a person would be
willing to accept to put up with something undesirable, such as a
specified increase in their risk of death or serious bodily injury.
WTP refers to the maximum amount of money a person would be
willing to pay for something desirable, such as a specified
reduction in their risk of death or serious bodily injury.5 °
Three types of changes in individuals' well-being are of
particular concern to me in this Article. First, as is generally
accepted, a person who bears a risk of death or serious bodily
injury suffers a setback to a well-being-related interest,"' even if
the risk never materializes. Typically, this sort of setback is
quantified in terms of a WTA in the amount of 1/r x V, where 1/r
represents the probability of the risk materializing in injury to
that person and V represents the WTA associated with
sustaining the injury itself. Thus, if life is valued at $5 million,
the WTA associated with, for example, bearing a one in one
thousand risk of death is $5,000 and the WTA associated with
bearing a one in ten thousand risk of death is $500."2 The
201 (offering and defending an account of well-being that allows for interpersonal
comparability).
149 See, e.g., id. at 89.
1. Suppose X is better

off under outcome 0 than under outcome 0'. A
preference-based account of well-being maintains that this just means that X prefers
O to 0'. We might then ask how much better off X is under 0 than under 0', that is,
how strongly X prefers 0 to 0'. One way to answer this question would be to specify
the minimum amount of money X would be willing to accept for a move from 0 to

O'-this is X's WTA. Another way to answer the question would be to specify the
maximum amount of money X would be willing to pay for a move from 0' to O-this

is X's WTP. This is precisely how CBA quantifies changes in individuals' well-being.
See, e.g., id. at 6.

...I thank Johann Frick for this phrasing.
112 See, e.g., Posner & Sunstein, supra note 14, at 560; W. Kip Viscusi, The Value
of Life: Estimates with Risks by Occupation and Industry, 42 J. ECON. INQUIRY 29,
29 (2004); Thomas J. Kniesner et al., Willingness To Accept Equals Willingness To
Pay for Labor Market Estimates of the Value of Statistical Life 1-3 (Vanderbilt Univ.
Law School Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 13-06, 2013); W. Kip Viscusi,
Estimating the Value of a Statistical Life Using Census of Fatal Occupational
Injuries (CFOI) Data 1 (Vanderbilt Univ. Law School Law & Econ. Working Paper
No. 13-17, 2013). Therefore, a reduction in a person's risk of death from 1 in 1,000 to

1 in 10,000 would be "worth" $4,500 to her in the following sense: The amount of
money she would be willing to accept to bear a 1 in 10,000 risk of death is $4,500 less
than the amount she would be willing to accept to bear a 1 in 1,000 risk of death.
Alternatively, she would be willing to pay $4,500 for the reduction. See Kniesner et
al., supra, at 1 (arguing "that there is no... significant divergence between
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underlying idea is that a rational person would be willing to
accept a sufficiently large amount of money to be exposed to an
additional risk of death that, while not insignificant, is still quite
low. Second, a person who bears a monetary cost (for example,
the cost of safety precautions) experiences a reduction in wellbeing. Here, quantifying the reduction in well-being in terms of
WTA is straightforward: The WTA associated with bearing a
monetary cost is simply the amount of the cost itself. Finally, a
person who derives a benefit from a particular industrial
activity-or from a coordinated system of such activitiesexperiences a gain in well-being that can be quantified in terms
of WTP. By the same token, when a particular socially beneficial
activity is discontinued, the reduction in well-being each
beneficiary consequently experiences can be quantified in terms
of WTA. "3
E.

Justifying the Economic Feasibility Cap on Precaution

Under the IFP, investment in safety precaution is capped at
the economic feasibility point, that is, the point at which further
reduction of the risk would threaten to undermine the survival of
the socially beneficial activity giving rise to the risk. What is the
ex ante contractualist rationale for capping safety expenditures
at this point? In contractualist terms: Why is it that no one
could reasonably reject a precautionary standard that caps safety
expenditures at the economic feasibility point?5 4

willingness to accept and willingness to pay in the important case of the decisions
workers make concerning exposure to fatal injury risk").
13 As noted above, in calculating WTA and WTP in this Article, I assume for
sake of simplicity that all affected individuals have identical levels of existing
wealth, and so assume away the complications that arise due to the diminishing
marginal utility of money. Thus, all affected individuals are assumed to experience
the identical reduction in well-being as the result of bearing a specified monetary
cost. Further, all individuals are assumed to have the identical WTA for a specified
increase in their risk of death and the identical WTP for a specified reduction in that
risk. See supra note 88. In future work, I hope to address this issue in greater detail.
154 In their critique of feasibility analysis, Masur and Posner fail to consider the
possibility that contractualism, or social contract theory more broadly, provides a

normative justification for the economic feasibility principle. See Masur & Posner,

supra note 62, at 707 (making no mention of contractualism or social contract theory
in discussing whether feasibility analysis has an "alternative normative basis" aside
from welfarism and opining that feasibility analysis "clearly does not reflect
deontological thinking").
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Contractualism's emphasis on considering the consequences
of a precautionary standard's general acceptance, as well as its
acceptance in the case of a particular risk or activity, is key
here.15 It means that, in the rejectability inquiry, each affected
individual can lodge complaints based not only on how
acceptance of a given precautionary standard would affect her in
the case of a particular risk posed by a particular activity, but
also on how she would be affected, over the course of her lifetime,
by the standard's application to all risks to which it applies and
to all activities that pose such risks.5 6
General acceptance of a precautionary standard lacking a
cap at the point of maximal economic feasibility 7 would
plausibly result in the discontinuation of many, if not most, of the
life-improving, liberty-enhancing activities that define modern
life. 5
Many, if not most, of the socially beneficial activities
undertaken in modern, industrialized societies pose risks that
either cannot, given present technology, be eliminated or would
be so costly to eliminate that the underlying activity would no
longer be worth engaging in. 5 9
155 See SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE, supra note 28, at 202-03 ("[W]hen we are
considering the acceptability or rejectability of a principle, we must take into
account not only the consequences of particular actions, but also the consequences of
general performance or nonperformance of such actions and of the other implications
(for both agents and others) of having agents be licensed and directed to think in the
way that that principle requires.").
156 Scanlon calls this feature of contractualism "intrapersonal aggregation," that
is, "aggregation within each person's life, summing up all the ways in which a
principle demanding a certain level of care would constrain that life, rather than
aggregation across lives, adding up the costs or benefits to different individuals." Id.
at 237; see also Oberdiek, supra note 55, at 146-51 (discussing the notion of
intrapersonal aggregation).
157 Examples of precautionary standards that would often dictate a greaterthan-feasible expenditure on precaution include a "safety" standard, which directs
risks to be reduced to the point at which they are no longer significant regardless of
cost or impact on the industry, and a technological feasibility standard, which
directs risks to be reduced as much as possible given available technology,
regardless of cost or the impact on the industry. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 32,
at 1237-39, 1252-53.
151 See, e.g., Fried, Limits, supra note 19, at 260.
159 Id.
("Because virtually everything we do (or, acting as the state, permit
others to do) carries some irreducible risk of serious harm to others, virtually
everything we do (or permit others to do) entails interpersonal trade-offs."); Fried,
Contractualism, supra note 21, at 61 ("But in most arenas of life,.., the point at
which further investments in safety will cease to produce any positive return in
safety is far beyond the projected benefits of the project. The result of interpreting
'reasonable' in this fashion will thus be moral gridlock by a different route. No
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Were the majority, or even a significant proportion, of risky,
socially beneficial activities discontinued, we would live in a very
different world, one resembling the pre-industrial, more-or-less
agrarian society prevalent in the Western world prior to the
Industrial Revolution. Major industrial activities such as large
scale construction projects, the production of gasoline and
natural gas, the manufacture of automobiles and other gas- or
electric-powered road vehicles, and the manufacture of
prescription drugs would cease to exist, as they pose risks that
cannot feasibly be eliminated or reduced to a level that is no
longer significant.
Such a state of affairs would give rise to a profound
complaint from a person who enjoys the manifold benefits that
flow from the complex of socially beneficial, but risky, activities
that make possible modern life. General acceptance of a pure
safety standard, a technological feasibility standard, or any other
precautionary principle that routinely dictated a higher level of
precaution than was economically feasible would deprive each
beneficiary of the plausibly enormous benefit realized from the
wide class of activities whose risks cannot feasibly be eliminated
or reduced to the point of insignificance.
The key question from a contractualist perspective is
whether this complaint is stronger than a risk-bearer's ex ante
complaint with a principle that caps precaution at the point of
economic feasibility. Who, in other words, bears the heavier
burden: the person deprived of the benefits of the (plausibly
large) class of socially beneficial activities whose risks cannot
feasibly be eliminated or reduced to the point at which they are
no longer significant, or the person exposed to a significant risk
of death or serious injury from one or more activities of this kind?
While it seems clear that each of us would rather be deprived
of the manifold benefits of industrialized society than suffer
death or serious bodily harm,"' the question becomes a much
building project will show a net expected benefit, given the enormous amount one
would be required to spend on safety precautions, and hence no building project will
go forward.").
160 If the choice is between living healthily and able-bodied in an agrarian, preindustrial society and living as a quadriplegic in modem, industrialized society,
most of us would, I imagine, choose the former. Of course, even pre-industrial society
was not without socially beneficial activities that generated significant risks of harm
(for example, large-scale construction, ship-building, and so on). One thing that
seems to define modern, industrial society is that the risks posed by such activities
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closer one when the certain deprivation of the manifold benefits
of modern industrialized society is the price to be paid for
avoiding a mere risk to one's physical integrity. As Keating
points out, preserving the life-improving, liberty-enhancing
benefits to be derived from the many activities in modern,
industrialized societies posing significant risks of serious bodily
harm seems at least comparable in value to protecting one's
bodily integrity from significant risk.16 1 Where the risk of death
or serious injury is low, but still nontrivial (say, somewhere
between one in one thousand and one in fifty thousand), the
overwhelming odds are, supposing that I am exposed to such a
risk, that my physical integrity will remain intact. In light of
that probability, and given the profound benefits to be realized
from the many activities whose risks cannot feasibly be
eliminated, it seems likely that even someone who faces a
significant risk of death from a particular socially beneficial
activity would prefer the feasibility principle, which tolerates
that risk but preserves all socially beneficial activities posing
similar risks, to a principle which eliminates the risk at the price
of shutting down the vast majority of such activities.
Moreover, among the benefits provided by the productive
activities that pose significant risks is a dramatic reduction in
the risks to bodily integrity posed by non-anthropogenic causes
like disease, natural disasters, and climatic variations. This
means that the discontinuation of the majority of such activities
could plausibly be supposed to result in a profound increase in
the risks to bodily integrity faced by the beneficiaries of such
activities.6 2 If the price for continuing such activities were the
creation of huge risks to bodily integrity-something on the order
of a one in ten risk of death-then the risk-bearer's complaint
might well carry the day. But the risks of death or serious injury
became comparable in magnitude to the risks posed by the composite of natural

causes (like disease and natural disasters) and anthropogenic activities that are not
clearly socially beneficial (for example, war, slavery, and so on).
161 See Keating, Pressing Precaution, supra note 18, at 727 ("Shutting down

most of the major productive activities in our economy would be a harm comparable
to bearing a significant risk of devastating injury.").
162 Just as one illustration, the world average life expectancy at birth in 1900
was 31 years, and under 50 years in even the richest countries. By the midtwentieth century, the average rose to 48 years. By 2005, this figure had risen to
65.6 years, and over 80 years in some countries. See World Health Org., Health,
History and Hard Choices: Funding Dilemmas in a Fast-Changing World (Aug.
2006), http://www.who.int/global-health-histories/seminars/presentation07.pdf.

2014]

REASONABLE PRECA UTION

posed by most socially beneficial activities can feasibly be
reduced to a level that, while not insignificant, is still quite low
(less than one in one hundred).6 3 If a significant but low risk of
serious bodily harm to A can be eliminated only at the price of
dramatically increasing the risk of serious bodily harm to B, then
it would seem that B has a stronger complaint with a principle
that eliminates the risk to A then A has with a principle that
tolerates that risk, but reduces it to the maximum extent
feasible. That is, it seems unreasonable to ask beneficiaries of
activities posing significant risks to accept an increase in their
risk of death and serious injury to levels that are perilously high
in absolute terms in order that bearers of such risks can enjoy a
reduction in their risk of death and serious injury from a level
that is significant, but still low in absolute terms, to a level that
is insignificant. On this basis, it seems any beneficiary of the
wide class of socially beneficial activities posing ineliminable
risks of serious harm would have a stronger complaint with a
precautionary principle lacking a cap at the economic feasibility
point than a risk-bearer would have with a precautionary
principle that incorporated such a cap.
In the case of workplace or consumption risks, this
conclusion seems to follow with particular force because the riskbearing worker or consumer benefits-often in a profound wayfrom the very activity that places her at risk. For example, the oil
refinery worker who bears a significant risk of death from
exposure to benzene, a toxic chemical used in the refining
process, would be greatly disadvantaged by a cessation of oil
refining activity, since that activity provides her with gainful
employment.14 A safety standard would bring oil refining to a
halt unless the risks it poses to workers could be reduced to an
insignificant level. 6 5 Under the feasibility principle, on the other
163

See, e.g., KEETON

ET

AL.' supra note 32, at 1234-35 ("Typical occupational

risk of death in occupations of average risk are 2.7 per 1,000 for all manufacturing
and 1.62 per 1,000 for all service employment. Typical lifetime occupational risks of

death in occupations of relatively low risk are 0.48 per 1,000 in electric equipment
and 0.07 per 1,000 in retail clothing." (quoting 52 Fed. Reg. 34460, 34507 (Sept. 11,
1987))).
164 See generally Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 642
(1980) (discussing OSHA standards for permissible workplace exposure to benzene).
1
See id. at 641 ("[W]e think it is clear that the statute was not designed to
require employers to provide absolutely risk-free workplaces whenever it is
technologically feasible to do so, so long as the cost is not great enough to destroy an
entire industry. Rather, both the language and structure of the Act, as well as its
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hand, the worker is guaranteed a continued livelihood from oil
refining; her benzene risk is reduced to the maximum extent
possible without violating that guarantee."'
In light of the above considerations, it seems that any
beneficiary of the class of socially beneficial activities that pose
significant risks of death or serious injury-even a beneficiary
who herself is exposed to one or more such risks-would have a
stronger objection to any principle that lacked a cap at the point
of economic feasibility (and routinely dictated greater-thanfeasible expenditures on safety) than the bearer of a significant
risk would have to a principle incorporating such a cap. In other
words, it would be unreasonable to ask someone to forego the
manifold
liberty-enhancing,
life-improving,
life-extending
benefits of socially productive activities that pose significant
risks in order that someone else should be able avoid bearing a
significant, but still low, risk of death or serious injury. Thus, I
conclude that, per ex ante contractualism, no one could
reasonably reject a precautionary standard incorporating a cap at
the point of economic feasibility.
F.

Justifying the Individual Risk Principle Cap on Precaution

What is the ex ante contractualist justification for capping
safety precaution at the point dictated by the individual risk
principle, that is, the point at which further investment in safety
would reduce the well-being of each cost-bearer more than it
would increase the expected well-being of each risk-bearer?
As discussed in Part II, the basic intuition behind capping
precaution at this point is that not to do so would mean requiring
each cost-bearer to invest in safety precaution past the point at
which a risk-bearer would rationally cease investing in her own
safety, were she asked to shoulder a single cost-bearer's share of
precaution costs. Under ex ante contractualism, could a costbearer reasonably reject a principle sanctioning such a tradeoff?.

legislative history, indicate that it was intended to require the elimination, as far as
feasible, of significant risks of harm.").

166 See Keating, Pressing Precaution, supra note 18, at 727 ("The argument

against shutting down most of society's major productive activities is an argument of
fairness-the workers employed by those activities would be harmed in the long run
by the elimination of these activities, even though these activities exact a significant
toll on the lives and health of those very workers.").
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To make this more concrete, consider a variation of the
suspension bridge hypothetical discussed supra in the
Introduction.
As above, assume the safety netting is an
economically feasible safety precaution, that is, that its use
throughout the bridge construction industry would not threaten
the industry's long-term viability. However, suppose it is not a
city of five million that is building the bridge, but rather a town
of twenty-five thousand. Suppose further that the netting will
reduce each of the two thousand workers' risk of dying in a fall by
just five percent (rather than by fifty percent, as in the original
hypothetical). At $10 million, the netting imposes a cost of $400
on each town resident, while lowering each worker's risk of a
fatal fall from one in one thousand to (roughly) one in one
thousand and fifty-three.6 7 Assigning life a value of $5 million,
each worker would rationally be willing to pay no more than
$250 for such a reduction in her own risk of death.
The individual risk principle would prohibit investment in
the safety netting under these circumstances, since the netting
would impose a monetary cost of $400 on each cost-bearer for the
sake of providing each risk-bearer with a reduction in risk worth
only $250.1"s In other words, the individual risk principle forbids

167 To be precise, if the netting is used, each worker's risk of death falls from 20
in 20,000 to 19 in 20,000.
1"' It is worth noting that efficient care would also reject the investment in the
netting under these circumstances, but for very different reasons. With its focus on
aggregate costs, efficient care rejects the netting in this scenario because its total
cost exceeds the resulting savings in expected accident costs, that is, installing the
netting involves investing $10 million in order to reduce expected accident costs by
$500,000. By contrast, under the IFP, the netting is rejected because the burden its
use imposes on each individual cost-bearer (a monetary cost of $400) exceeds the
burden its nonuse imposes on each individual risk-bearer (a slightly increased risk
of death, one which each worker would rationally be willing to accept for $250). In a
case like this, where both the IFP and the efficient care standard dictate the
identical result (here, not to take a particular precaution), it is worth asking which
standard provides the more morally compelling justification. One provocative way to
pose this question is to imagine how the city would justify its decision not to invest
in the safety netting to the family of an unlucky worker whose fatal fall (assume it
could be shown) would have been prevented by the netting. The efficient care
standard is founded on a welfarist justification that would go roughly as follows:
Obviously, we had no way of knowing that this terrible accident was going
to happen. We had to make a decision based on probabilities. We looked at
the total cost of the netting, and compared that to the probability that the
netting would save a life. We concluded that the total cost of the netting far
exceeded the expected savings in total accident costs the netting would
have delivered. Can you blame us for not making a safety investment that,
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investment in the safety netting because it would set back each
city resident's well-being (through a monetary cost) more than it
would increase each bridge worker's expected well-being (through
increased safety). If no rational worker would be willing to spend
$400 to achieve a five percent reduction in her own risk of death,
it would arguably be unreasonable to expect a city resident to
make that safety investment.
Could a principle that disallowed safety expenditures of this
kind-that is, a precautionary standard that capped safety
precaution at the point dictated by the individual risk principlebe reasonably rejected under ex ante contractualism? The person
most burdened by general acceptance of such a cap would be the
risk-bearer exposed to higher risks of death or serious bodily
harm than she would be exposed to under an alternative
principle that did not cap safety investment at this point (for
example, a pure economic feasibility principle). On the other
hand, the person most burdened by general acceptance of a
precautionary standard that did not cap precaution at this point
would be the cost-bearer forced to shoulder greater safety costs
than she would have to shoulder were precaution costs capped at
the point dictated by the individual risk principle.
Who has the stronger complaint? It seems evident that the
cost-bearer does. A representative risk-bearer's complaint with
the individual risk cap would have to be based on her exposure to
the sort of risk the cap tolerates, that is, a risk that sets back her
expected well-being by less than it would set back each costbearer's well-being to eliminate. By contrast, a representative
given the information available at the time the decision had to be made,
was expected to have made everyone worse off?
The JFP, on the other hand, is founded on a contractualist justification of a very
different sort:
Obviously, we had no way of knowing that this terrible accident was going
to happen. We had to make a decision based on probabilities. We looked at
the netting's cost to each city resident, and asked whether a worker would
rationally have been willing to make that investment for the resulting
reduction in her own risk. We determined that no worker, given the
information available at the time the decision had to be made, would
rationally have been willing to make that safety investment on her own
behalf. For that reason, we concluded that we could not reasonably ask
each city resident to make the investment on the workers' behalf. Can you
blame us for not asking each city resident to make an investment in your
loved one's safety that your loved one herselfwould not rationally have been
willing to make in her own safety?
To my ears, the contractualist justification carries greater moral force.
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cost-bearer's complaint with a precautionary standard lacking
the individual risk cap would be based on her having to shoulder
the sort of monetary cost the cap precludes, that is, a cost that
sets back her well-being by more than the risk it eliminates
would have set back each risk-bearer's expected well-being. The
risk-bearer is complaining about a burden whose elimination
would impose a greater burden on the cost-bearer; the costbearer, on the other hand, is complaining about a burden whose
elimination would impose a lesser burden on the risk-bearer.
The risk-bearer cannot reasonably refuse to bear that burden. It
would be unreasonable for a risk-bearer to refuse to accept the
setback to her expected well-being (that is, the greater risk)
associated with capping precaution at the point dictated by the
individual risk principle in order that each cost-bearer can avoid
the necessarily greater setback to well-being (that is, the
increased monetary cost) associated with pressing precaution
beyond that point. It follows that no one could reasonably reject
a precautionary standard that capped safety expenditures at the
point dictated by the individual risk principle.
The foregoing analysis is premised on the idea that, in
determining the reasonable level of precaution, it is appropriate
to make straightforward interpersonal tradeoffs in well-being
between a person exposed to a risk of serious harm and a person
who bears a share of the costs of reducing that risk through
safety precautions. Specifically, the cap on safety expenditures
imposed by the individual risk principle prohibits taking a
specified safety precaution if its monetary cost to each costbearer exceeds the amount of money that each risk-bearer would
rationally be willing to pay for the resulting reduction in risk.
This sort of tradeoff between one person's monetary burden
and another person's risk of serious bodily harm seems clearly
appropriate when the risk at issue is imposed as a necessary
incident of an activity that provides both persons-cost-bearer
and risk-bearer-with a direct and significant benefit, as is
generally true in the case of workplace risks and consumption
risks. For example, in the case of a workplace risk posed by a
firm's socially beneficial activity, the worker exposed to the risk
and the firm shareholder who bears a share of the costs of
reducing that risk are cooperatively engaged in an enterprise
that stands to benefit them both, as it provides the worker with a
livelihood and the shareholder with a share of profits. The
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worker's contribution is, among other things, to tolerate the
activity's ineliminable risks; the shareholder's contribution is,
among other things, to shoulder the costs of safety precautions
that reduce those risks. Both contributions are necessary for the
activity to move forward, and both involve a reduction in wellbeing. In light of these facts, and given that both worker and
shareholder stand to benefit directly and significantly from the
risky activity, fairness arguably requires that their contributions
to the activity (that is, the setback to well-being each must
tolerate in order for the activity to move forward) be marginally
equalized in the manner required by the individual risk
principle. True, there is a sense in which the shareholder, as an
owner of the firm that engages in the risky activity, is imposing
the risk on the worker for the worker's own benefit, but the risk
imposition redounds to the worker's benefit as well, as it is the
price of the activity's existence, and the activity benefits the
worker significantly on net.
What, though, about a case in which the person exposed to
the risk does not directly benefit from the risky activity?. 9 Can
the cap on safety precaution imposed by the individual risk
principle defensibly be applied in such a case?17 ° In other words,
can the same sort of straightforward interpersonal tradeoff be
made between one person's monetary burden and another's risk
of serious bodily harm when the risk-bearer is a bystander who
derives no direct benefit from the activity, for example, someone
who happens to live next to a cement factory that emits
carcinogenic fumes into the air, but who neither works at the
factory nor consumes its products?.71
This is a difficult normative question that requires a
lengthier treatment than I can provide here. It may be that,
when it comes to risks imposed on persons who derive no direct
16

See, e.g., Sven Ove Hansson, Risk and Ethics: Three Approaches, in RISK:

PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 17, at 26 (explaining that a key question

in the analysis of the ethics of risk is to what extent the risk exposed benefit from
the risk exposure).
17 I thank Aaron James for impressing upon me the importance of addressing

this question, which I plan to explore in greater detail in future work.
171 See, e.g., Richard W. Wright, The Standards of Care in Negligence Law, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 249, 260-68 (David G. Owen ed., 1995)

(advocating a more stringent standard of care for situations in which the defendant
put the plaintiff at risk to benefit the defendant or some third party than for
situations in which the defendant put the plaintiff at risk at least partially to benefit
the plaintiff).
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benefit from the risk-creating activity, capping safety
expenditures at the point dictated by the individual risk principle
17 2
is not, in fact, defensible from a contractualist point of view.
Even if that were true, though, it would not follow that imposing
such risks is indefensible altogether under ex ante
contractualism.
A principle that categorically forbade the
imposition of risks on non-beneficiaries would be reasonably
rejectable under ex ante contractualism, since such a principle
would foreclose any socially beneficial activity that posed
ineliminable risks of harm to persons who derive no direct
benefit from that activity. And this would plausibly have a
stultifying effect on socially beneficial activity generally, since
few socially beneficial activities, it seems, could claim to impose
ineliminable risks of serious harm exclusively on persons who
directly benefit from the activity. If that is true, then such a
principle could be reasonably rejected for much the same reasons
as a precautionary standard that failed to cap safety
expenditures at the point of economic feasibility, that is, its
general acceptance would force most, if not all, socially
productive activity to grind to a halt.1 73 At the most, then, ex
ante contractualism would require that the risks a socially
beneficial activity imposes on non-beneficiaries, like the cement
factory neighbor, be reduced to the extent economically feasible.
G. Justifying the IFPas a Floor for Safety Precaution
In the previous two Sections, I argue that ex ante
contractualism sets the IFP as a moral ceiling on investment in
safety precautions that mitigate the risks of serious harm posed
by socially beneficial activities. What I have not yet done is
explain why ex ante contractualism sets the IFP as a moral floor
for safety investment in such cases. Why, from a contractualist
point of view, must precaution be pressed all the way to the point
dictated by the IFP, particularly if, as will often be the case, it
will be inefficient to do so?
172

See, e.g., Simons, supra note 18, at 1212 & n.96 ("[W]here the potential

victims do not benefit from the risky activity, many nonconsequentialists would
object that a simple benefit/risk or cost/benefit analysis is inadequate to justify the
risk, insofar as one party benefits at the other party's expense." "The important
point is that, everything else being equal, nonbeneficiaries of the activity are
entitled to greater protection from risks of harm than are beneficiaries.").
173 See supra Part III.E.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88:653

The reason for this is straightforward. Until the level of
safety precaution dictated by the IFP is reached, further
investment in safety would enhance each risk-bearer's expected
well-being through increased safety by more than it would set
back each cost-bearer's well-being through a monetary cost, and
would not pose a threat to the long-term viability of the activity
that gives rise to the risk. It would be unreasonable for a costbearer to refuse to make such an investment, which would
necessarily burden him or her by less than not making the
investment would burden each risk-bearer.
It would be
unreasonable, in other words, for a cost-bearer to refuse to accept
the setback to the cost-bearer's expected well-being (that is, the
greater monetary cost) associated with pressing precaution to the
point dictated by the IFP in order that each risk-bearer can avoid
the necessarily greater setback to well-being (that is, the greater
risk) associated with capping precaution below that point. The
basic idea is this: When I benefit directly from an activity that
poses a risk of death or serious injury to you, it is unreasonable
for me to invest any less in safety precautions than I would
rationally have been willing to invest were it my own bodily
integrity that was at stake, up to the point at which further
investment would jeopardize the activity's existence.
For example, returning to the original suspension bridge
hypothetical described supra in the Introduction, it would be
unreasonable for a city resident to refuse to pay $2 so that each
bridge worker can enjoy a risk reduction worth $2,500 (recall
that if the safety netting is used, each worker's risk of death falls
from one in one thousand to one in two thousand). After all, were
her own bodily integrity at issue, a rational city resident would
gladly pay $2 for such a reduction in the risk of death she faces.
It would be unreasonable for a city resident to refuse to make
this safety investment simply because it is someone else's bodily
integrity at stake rather than her own. It follows that, according
to ex ante contractualism, no one could reasonably reject a
precautionary standard that required investing in safety
precaution up to the point dictated by the IFP.
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CONCLUSION

In this Article, I introduce and defend an alternative
interpretation of reasonable precaution, one that, in my view,
deserves to be considered alongside efficient care and other
aggregative standards.
I hope to have shown that the
individualized feasibility principle is capable of serving as a
viable substantive decision rule for regulating risky activities,
one that can reliably guide decisions about safety investment in
specific cases. That is, I hope, at a minimum, to have shown that
the IFP is viable in the "very undemanding sense" Fried has in
mind, that is, that it is a decision rule "capable of differentiating
'
among different forms of risky conduct."1 74
As the safety netting
example should make clear, the IFP yields a determinate answer
to the question whether, in a given instance, a particular safety
precaution should be taken. Whatever else one might think
about the IFP, it clearly seems capable of offering determinate
guidance as to the level of safety investment required in
particular cases.
I hope further to have shown both that the deliverances of
the IFP will typically differ, often significantly, from those of the
efficient care standard and that the IFP will often yield results
that are intuitively more plausible.17
In particular, in the
common situation in which an activity's risks are concentrated on
a group of persons that is a small fraction of the size of the group
among whom safety precaution costs are spread, the IFP can
accommodate the intuition that acting reasonably may require
pressing precaution beyond the point at which aggregate wellbeing would be maximized.
If I have succeeded in meeting these goals, this Article can
be seen as making the case for a sort of pluralism in the
normative analysis of risk imposition.7 ' On the one hand,
174 See Fried, Limits, supra note 19, at 233-34.
17 Further, I hope to have at least suggested why,

in cases where the IFP and
the efficient care standard agree as to whether a particular precaution should be
taken, the ex ante contractualism underlying the IFP provides a more compelling
normative justification for that result than does the welfarism underlying the
efficient care standard. See supra note 168.
17 I thank Johann Frick for suggesting to me the possibility of conceptualizing
the matter in this way. See Johann Frick, Contractualism and Social Risk - How To
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evaluating the morality of risk imposition exclusively from the
perspective of aggregative CBA will lead to implausible results in
important types of cases.
As the safety netting example
illustrates, a nonaggregative standard keyed to the benefits and
burdens experienced by each differently-situated individual is
needed to take proper account of morally relevant differences in
how the same aggregate cost (or benefit) can be distributed
among distinct persons. On the other hand, as noted supra in
the Introduction, I think it would be a mistake to reject
aggregative reasoning altogether when it comes to the morality of
risk imposition. Just as there are cases in which the IFP better
accords with common moral intuitions than the efficient care
standard does, there may well be cases in which the efficient care
standard delivers results that seem intuitively more correct than
those the IFP delivers.
This suggests that any instance of risk imposition ought to
be examined through two different and complementary lenses:
the lens of ex ante contractualist analysis, exemplified by the
IFP, and the lens of aggregative CBA, exemplified by the efficient
care standard. In many cases, these analyses will point in the
same direction; both will require taking a particular safety
precaution or leaving a particular precaution untaken. When the
analyses point in different directions (as in the safety netting
example discussed supra in the Introduction), judgment will need
to be exercised to decide which lens seems to provide the more
morally defensible result. Perhaps there is a theory-as yet
undiscovered-which can provide the intuitively correct result in
all cases. Until such a theory is brought forward, however, the
only reasonable approach seems to be to look at every instance of
risk imposition through both an aggregative lens and a
contractualist lens, and make a considered judgment based on
what appears.

Count the Numbers Without Aggregating 45-49 (Mar. 15, 2014) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).

